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ABSTRACT
This report reviews factors that can impact an offensive lineman’s salary in the National
Football League. For years, factors measured by performance statistics have been gathered in
various sports as a method to estimate a player’s production. Understanding performance
statistics that impact a baseball player’s salary was popularized by the movie Moneyball, but
limited work in this regard has been done to measure effectiveness or efficiency of offensive
linemen in American football. The lack of publicly available data and many
interdependencies in football make it difficult to objectively understand how salaries can best
be determined. This study uses a quantitative approach and a single-equation model with a
unique data set to explore the determinants of wages of offensive linemen in an open market.
The data set consists of explanatory variables measured by the previous season’s individual
statistics, team statistics, and statistics based on nonoffensive line positions along with
characteristics of offensive linemen, such as the player’s age. The study found that several
variables impact the salary of an offensive lineman in free agency, such as the number of
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games started. It is hoped that this study will provide a building block for additional research
on wage determination in American football.
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Introduction
A play on offense in American football begins with the ball being snapped from the
center to the quarterback. After the snap, if a quarterback moves backward on a pass play, the
offensive line, consisting of five players: left tackle, left guard, center, right guard, and right
tackle has a duty to stop the opponent’s defensive players on the field from tackling or
disrupting him (i.e., pass blocking) so that he can successfully throw the football to a wide
receiver, tight end, or running back (Alamar & Weinstein-Gould, 2008). On a running play in
which the quarterback typically hands off the ball to a running back, the offensive line’s goal
is to move or stop the opponent’s defensive players on the field (i.e., run blocking) from
impeding the player carrying the football.
The offensive line plays an important role on different running plays and passing
plays that make up the offensive play selection for a football team. Using running plays and
passing plays, the goal for the offense is to move the ball into the opponent’s end zone
without being stopped by the opposing defense. After each offensive play, decision-makers
such as general managers question and evaluate how much each player’s performance on the
field contributed to the success of the play. For example, in a single football play in which an
offensive running back runs for 20 yards, how much did his performance contribute to the
success of the play? How much did the entire offensive line’s performance contribute to the
play’s success? Or in a pass play of 50 yards to a wide receiver, how much did the
performance of the quarterback, the wide receivers and offensive line contribute to the play’s
success? The answers to these questions are often subjective in that different decision-makers
will value different players based on what they see just like scouts have different opinions on
players based on what they individually see. In light of this dilemma, establishing the wages
1

of players, specifically, that of an offensive lineman with only subjective measures may be
problematic.
From a more objective perspective, the amount of success on the field produced by
the labor of players is a factor that influences their respective wages. However, objectively
measuring success and how much a player deserves for their labor on a team is still difficult.
Labor, one of the four factors of production, is difficult to study within the sport of football
and specifically with offensive linemen because of the interdependencies within the unit
(e.g., teamwork between right guard and center on run block) and between units on offense
(e.g., quarterback’s decision-making skills when throwing ball and pass blocking by the
offensive line) are difficult to measure and evaluate, and the availability of public metrics for
measuring individual performance of offensive linemen is limited (Fizel, 2006). This paper is
one of the first to analyze in a quantitative manner the interaction of performance between
offensive linemen.
Quantitatively, a week-long annual showcase event for a select group of top
professional football prospects known as the National Football League (NFL) Combine
where, current metrics such as the 40-yard dash provide data to evaluate offensive linemen
but do not measure the production of the offensive lineman in a game. Players go through
physical tests, medical evaluations, interviews with NFL player personnel, and intelligence
exams. Physical tests, such as the broad jump, help quantify the explosiveness of the athlete
and provide data to talent evaluators to help project how well an ex-college football player
such as an offensive lineman will perform in the NFL and thus be compensated (Parekh,
2017). On the field, coaches study game scenarios to evaluate how offensive lineman
perform. For instance, a success/failure metric might be utilized by an offensive line coach to
2

determine the proportion of play in which an offensive lineman succeeded in terms of his
technique.
The method of grading offensive linemen such as the one mentioned above is unique
and can differ from team to team. Additionally, many current metrics, which would be
beneficial to evaluate offensive linemen and determine their wages, are not available to the
public because coaches don’t reveal grades on their players. Coaches do not want another
team’s coaches to know their evaluation of personnel because such knowledge could give the
opposing team an advantage.
In addition to the status quo, history reflects the lack of public metrics as the
compilation of statistics in American football began in the 1920s and did not differentiate
between yardage earned via pass plays, running plays, or kick returns. The data lacked
completeness because statistics such as kickoff returns and punt returns were not kept until
1941. Additionally, there was a lack of credibility with the statistics that were gathered
because the game was faster paced than, for example, baseball. Thus, those in attendance had
a difficult time compiling a statistic while watching the game live (first NFL televised game
was in 1939). By 1935, more-complete and more accurate individual and team statistics were
available, such as for rushing and passing. Still, the league lacked statistics on key situations,
such as yardage gained by the opponent after an interception and after a blocked punt
(Carroll, Palmer, & Thorn, 1989).
For the position of offensive lineman, statistics are scarce because their work is often
not documented statistically to the public. NFL.com (the official site of the NFL) has a
statistical board to enable fans to help gauge which players are performing their best at their
respective position. However, the web site does not list statistics related to the performance
3

of offensive linemen on its “League Leaders” board, while every other position, such as
quarterbacks and wide receivers, are represented.
In addition to the lack of metrics and publicly available statistics, the joint-production
nature of this team sport makes it difficult to measure what individual players contributed
toward winning a football game and thus how they should be compensated (Fizel, 2006).
Joint production is a distinct characteristic of the sport because football is a team sport of
many interdependencies on every play. This is especially true within the offensive line,
which functions as a unit of five players in run blocking and pass blocking. In total, 11
players work together to attempt to complete different tasks (e.g., blocking, throwing,
catching, running) to move the ball forward in order to score a touchdown or field goal, while
11 players on the opposing team try to stop the other team from moving the ball down the
field (Berri, Brook, & Schmidt, 2007). Even in situations where one offensive lineman makes
a key block, the others need to also deliver effective blocks, or else the outcome of the play
will be undesirable for the team on offense (Carroll et al., 1989). While the offensive line
works as a single unit, NFL teams pay offensive linemen based on their respective
evaluations of the individual player.
In a perfectly competitive market, many NFL teams would bid against each other for
the services of an individual player, causing a player’s salary to approach the amount of
revenue he produces for the team based on his individual productivity (Bradbury, 2008;
Quirk & Fort, 1992). The economic metric for this is marginal revenue production (MRP),
and much research on MRP has been done in other sports, such as baseball. In football,
however, in light of the difficulty of connecting individual productivity to revenue based on
the interdependency of the positions, one can look at production of other players at other
4

positions as a factor in determining wages for offensive linemen. For instance, the financial
compensation for a left tackle rose along with the compensation of quarterbacks (a position
in which wage determination has been shown in past literature) because the left tackle was
viewed as insurance on the owner’s investment (Lewis, 2007).
The financial compensation for linemen such as the left tackle has grown dramatically
as well. In 1957, the minimum salary for an NFL player was $5,000 per season. Many
players during that and previous eras would hold offseason jobs to pay their bills (Michael,
2014). For offensive linemen, the top-paid players in the 1960s, such as Chicago Bears center
Mike Pyle, were paid $14,000 per season. Long-time starting left tackle Billy Shields, who
played in the 1970s and 1980s for a total of 11 seasons, was paid less than a total of $1
million over his entire career. According to a survey in 1981, the average salary of linemen
was the lowest of all positions on offense (“Average N.F.L. Salary,” 1982). The Cincinnati
Bengals football organization told offensive lineman Anthony Munoz in the 1980s that no
offensive lineman was worth $500,000 per season (Lewis, 2007). Literature in sport on racial
discrimination brings into question whether racism on behalf of the Cincinnati Bengals was a
determining factor in the devaluation of Munoz’s worth. During his playing career, players
won rights through strikes to earn a higher percentage of compensation from team revenue
and to gain the ability to collectively bargain, which enabled average salaries to continuously
grow to $414,900 per season in 1992 (average salary was $30,000 in 1977) to approximately
$496,300 per season by the start of the 1993 season (Stellino, 1992).
With the introduction of free agency in 1993 came an increase in spending on the
purchase of offensive linemen as free-agent pickups. During that year, lesser known
offensive linemen such as Harry Galbreath signed a three-year contract worth $1.52 million
5

per season. Top-rated free agent left tackle offensive lineman Will Wolford signed a unique
contract in 1993 worth $7.65 million over three years with the Indianapolis Colts. The
contract included a clause that guaranteed Wolford that he would be the highest paid
offensive player annually on the team. Virtually no statistics were available at that time to
measure his productivity as a player, yet he was compensated as if he was the most
productive offensive player on the team (Lewis, 2007). With proper metrics, one can measure
how much a player such as Wolford contributed to his team’s success (i.e., marginal
productivity) and then use this value to compensate him accordingly during free agency. By
identifying and understanding wage determinants of offensive linemen through the present
research, the general manager of a football team can gain a competitive advantage by better
understanding the labor and nonlabor forces that impact salaries for offensive linemen.
Additionally, to this author’s knowledge, this report is the first study of wage
determination of its kind for offensive linemen. The response variable consists solely of
salaries of offensive linemen who are unrestricted free agents. This models an open,
competitive market. A unique mix of explanatory variables from different levels, such as the
offensive unit, the offensive line unit (e.g., interaction component), and a unit for an
individual player enables one to gain a thorough understanding of labor and nonlabor forces
(such as play calling) that impact wages of offensive linemen. Future research and
development of new individual performance statistics, coupled with a revenue function,
might enable one to evaluate MRP of offensive linemen.

6

Research Topic: Wage Determination
A key situational component in determining wages is a person’s experience in their
labor market (Mincer, 1974). Dr. Jacob Mincer, credited as a pioneer for his single-equation
model, used experience (variable T) as an explanatory variable in his earning’s function:
(A1)

Where SAL = earnings, SAL_0 = earnings of someone with no education and no experience,
S = years of schooling, and T = years of potential labor market experience (Mincer, 1974).
Log of salaries was taken because earnings are naturally positively skewed. T acts as
an inverted “U” in the life cycle of earnings because it acts as a method of formal training
and also brings about a deterioration of production (Mincer, 1958).
A person’s earnings should approach their MRP, which is defined as the additional
revenue credited to an additional worker in a perfectly competitive market (Bradbury, 2008;
Quirk & Fort, 1992). Individual player productivity in sport can be measured by marginal
production (MP), which is defined as the number of wins an individual generates for their
respective team (Santo & Mildner, 2010). A common method used to determine production
is linear weights (using ordinary least squares). Of key interest in the process of calculating
MP is the team percent win function for the sport of baseball that was credited by Scully
(1974a) as follows:
(A2)

Where PCTWIN = percentage of wins, TSA = team slugging average, TSW = team
strikeout-to-walk ratio, NL = one for playing in the National League (dummy variable),
7

CONT = one for pennant or divisional winners (dummy variable), and OUT = one for teams
that are 20 or more games out of first place in their division.
A key determinant in the wage model is individual performance. In that sense, TSA
and TSW are our variables of interest. These performance variables have been attributed to
individual performance of baseball players (Scully, 1974a). Improvement in TSA and TSW
will impact PCTWIN (what’s that?) in a positive manner, and an increase in PCTWIN will
increase the revenue of a baseball team (Scully, 1974a). Thus, an individual’s batting average
and a pitcher’s strikeout-to-walk ratio are individual statistics that act as wage determinants
for a major league baseball player on a respective team. Once a player’s MP is determined, a
revenue equation, which is a function of MP, can determine the player’s MRP, which is what
a player produces in revenue for a particular team. In a perfectly competitive market, a
player’s salary would approach their MRP (Scully, 1974a).
Aside from individual performance, individual characteristic variables of players,
such as race, are considered as a possible determining factor of wages. Racial discrimination
occurs when people show bias against certain racial groups (Anderson & La Croix, 1991).
The study of racial discrimination is of interest to many labor economists in sport because of
readily available data on wage and performance statistics that are not common outside of the
field of professional sport (Hakes & Sauer, 2006). Following Becker (1971), a standard
approach to determine racial wage discrimination in sport is to estimate the following model:
(A3)

where Y = salary (or other decision variable); P = worker productivity, player characteristics,
and market variables; R = race (dummy variable); and
8

= error term.

A significant value for

lends evidence of discrimination, although this

interpretation proves to be difficult, unless all factors in P are accounted for (Berri et al.,
2007). The variables representing P and R act as wage determinants (Becker, 1971).
Research Problem: Wage Determination of NFL Offensive Linemen
In the NFL, offensive linemen play a key role in maximizing production, which
general managers encourage through high salaries (Lewis, 2007). Yet, traditional game
statistics, such as rushing yards and receiving touchdowns, are not available for this
particular position that would enable the researcher to better understand wage determinants.
However, this paper will contribute an additional avenue to evaluate offensive linemen
performance by using a unique set of variables (individual and team) for measuring the wage
determinants of offensive linemen in the NFL.
Additionally, an offensive line works as a single unit in itself (Carroll, Palmer, Thorn,
& Pietrusza, 1998). This presents the difficulty of measuring other factors that influence
individual productivity such as the general environment, in which there are several
interdependencies occurring during each play (Bradbury, 2008). Further, Idson and Kahane
(2000) found complementary effects (interaction) exist between inputs of labor (players),
individual productivity could be poorly measured as one attempts to separate the individual
from the team. The individual productivity of a given player might differ from team to team,
depending on the amount of assistance a player receives in each environment. Such
complementary effects in human-capital inputs create a team dynamic that impacts individual
effects and the player’s respective compensation (Idson & Kahane, 2000). This paper will
investigate possible complementary effects of offensive linemen.
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Research Purpose: Consistency of measures and explanatory power of outcomes
The purpose of this study is to investigate wage determinants of NFL offensive
linemen. This paper will utilize statistics from STATS LLC, Pro Football Reference,
NFL.com, and Spotrac. The STATS LLC statistics, to my knowledge, have not been used in
the literature.
Research Questions
1.) How are the wages of different positions in the NFL offensive line affected by
individual player performance?
1a.) Does the previous regular season proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by
individual offensive linemen affect wages?
1b.) Does the number of previous regular season games started by individual
offensive linemen affect wages?
1c.) Does the previous regular season proportion of penalties committed by individual
offensive linemen affect wages?
2.) How are the wages of different positions in the NFL offensive line affected by
team performance?
2a.) Does the number of previous regular season rushing yards of the offensive
lineman’s team affect wages?
2b.) Does the number of previous regular season passing yards of the offensive
lineman’s team affect wages?
2c.) Does the number of previous regular season total points scored by the offensive
lineman’s team affect wages?
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3.) How does relative performance of NFL offensive linemen affect their wages?
3a.) Do the previous regular season difference between a player’s proportion of
knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his offensive line teammates’ have an
impact on the player’s wages?
3b.) Do the previous regular season difference between the player’s proportion of
knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his new team’s proportion of knockdowns
allowed on quarterbacks have an impact on the player’s wages?
4.) How does the individual performance of nonoffensive line positions affect the
pay of different positions in the NFL offensive line?
4a.) Do the previous regular season adjusted line yards of the offensive lineman’s
team affect wages?
4b.) Do the previous regular season running backs’ yards before contact of the
offensive lineman’s team affect wages?
4c.) Do the previous regular season running backs’ average yards per carry of the
offensive lineman’s team affect wages?
4d.) Does the previous regular season power percentage of the offensive lineman’s
team affect wages?
4e.) Does the previous regular season stuff percentage of the offensive lineman’s
team affect wages?
5.) How does the play selection of a team affect the pay of different positions in the
NFL offensive line?
5a.) Does the previous regular season location run proportion of the offensive
lineman’s team affect wages?
11

5b.) Does the previous regular season run attempts to pass attempts ratio of the
offensive lineman’s team affect wages?
Delimitations
•

Study focuses only on offensive linemen in the NFL.

•

Uses publicly available data through STATS LLC, Spotrac, Pro Football Reference,
and NFL.com.

•

Data comes from NFL regular seasons of 2010-2016.

Limitations
•

Data set from STATS LLC, Spotrac, Pro Football Reference, and NFL.com does not
include elements such as current score, time remaining in game, down, and distance
of play, which would enable one to measure a player’s “clutch” ability and could be
used for other wage determination metrics, such as expected points and win
probability.

•

No data is available on individual offensive lineman run-blocking performance; thus,
run-blocking ability is measured through other means, such as team performance
statistics.

•

No data is available logging in number of offensive snaps per individual offensive
linemen for 2010-2012 seasons; thus, offense snaps logged during these seasons are
estimated based on games the player started.

•

No data is available with regards to specific injuries of players, which can impact
player performance on field.

12

Definition of Key Terms
Conceptual Definitions of Key Terms

Accrued season: a season that counts toward NFL free agency that one earns by being on a
team’s roster for six or more regular season games at full-pay status.
Defensive back: one of two defensive backs positioned in the secondary between the
linebackers and safeties, responsible for covering the outside areas near the sidelines against
end runs and pass plays.
Defensive end: a defensive player positioned across from an offensive tackle.
Defensive tackle: a defensive player positioned across from an offensive guard.
False start: an illegal movement by an offensive participant before the snap of the ball.
Fullback: a particular type of running back who is typically larger and more adept at
blocking.
Halfback: a term that is synonymous with running back.
Holding: a person illegally restrains a person who is not holding the ball.
Linebacker: a player on defense who takes a position close behind the linemen.
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Line of scrimmage: an imaginary line parallel to the goal lines that passes from one sideline
to the other through the point of the football closest to the goal line of each team.
Marginal production: the number of wins a player contributes to a team over a season.
Marginal revenue production: the revenue produced for a team by the individual
production of a player.
Offensive center: a specific position on the offensive line who is responsible for snapping
the ball to the quarterback.
Offensive guard: a specific position on the offensive line that is lined up between the center
and offensive tackle.
Offensive lineman: position on the offense whose primary job is to run-block on run plays
and pass-block on pass plays.
Offensive tackle: a specific position on the offensive line that is lined up outside the
offensive guard.
Quarterback: position on the offense that receives the ball at the start of the play from the
center and is primarily responsible for communicating and orchestrating the play.
Running back: position on offense that traditionally lines up behind the offensive linemen.
Safety: a player on the defense who lines up farthest behind the line of scrimmage.
Tight end: an offensive player positioned at one extremity of the line directly beside a
tackle, used as both a blocker and a pass receiver.
Unrestricted free agent: any player with at least four accrued seasons at the time his
contract expires.
Wide receiver: an offensive player positioned wide of the formation, as a split end, used
primarily as a pass receiver.
14

Operational Definitions of Key Terms
Adjusted line yards: metric created by Football Outsiders (football analytics company)
based on regression analysis; the adjusted line yards formula takes all running back carries
and assigns responsibility to the offensive line based on the following percentages:
•

Losses: 120% value.

•

0-4 yards: 100% value.

•

5-10 yards: 50% value.

•

11+ yards: 0% value.

Knockdown: a statistic in football credited to a defensive player or players when physical
contact with a quarterback causes him to fall down behind the line of scrimmage during a
passing play.
Location run proportion: Proportion of runs where a running back runs to the left, right, or
through a gap of an offensive lineman’s position.

(Yurko, Ventura, & Horowitz, 2018).
Power percentage: “Percentage of runs on third or fourth down, two yards or less to go, that
achieved a first down or touchdown. Also includes runs on first-and-goal or second-and-goal
from the two-yard line or closer” (includes quarterback runs, football outsiders.com).
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Sack: a statistic in football credited to a defensive player or players when physical contact
with a quarterback causes him to be ruled down by contact behind the line of scrimmage,
prior to an attempt to throw a forward pass or if the play is determined to resemble a passing
play.
Stuff percentage: “Percentage of runs where the running back is tackled at or behind the line
of scrimmage” (footballoutsiders.com).
Yards before contact: yards gained by a player rushing on offense prior to being contacted
by a defensive player.

16

Review of Literature
Wage Determination in Sport
The proposed model includes four distinct arenas that previous literature suggests can
lead to determining a fair-market assessment for employee salaries in sports- marginal
revenue production (MRP), race discrimination (non-MRP, emphasis on wage
discrimination), performance statistics, and the National Football League (NFL) Combine
metrics. First, MRP relates to the proposed wage-determinants model due to the usage of
performance variables in the production function. Further, in an open, competitive market, an
offensive lineman’s salary will approach their MRP (Kahn, 1992). Race discrimination (nonMRP, emphasis on wage discrimination) literature often encompasses the explanatory
variable of race (to measure possible discrimination), with performance variables acting as
controls, both of which are of interest to the researcher. The performance statistics section
enhances the reader’s understanding of metrics used in terms of evaluating a player’s
production, while NFL Combine metrics looks at common measurements of physical ability
used in the league that act as another form of evaluation and prediction.
a.) Marginal Revenue Production (marginal production included)
No research in MRP in football has been investigated specific to the sport, to this
author’s knowledge. Other research in sports, such as baseball, will be reviewed because
those academic works shed detailed light on important concepts covered in this dissertation.
Research related to MRP has been done in basketball and hockey, posing more difficulties in
estimating values of their respective professional athletes.

17

i.) Baseball
Scully (1974a) was the first to analyze MRP in sports, in baseball. He estimated the
amount of economic loss for baseball players thought to be caused by the reserve clause,
which restricted labor movement in Major League Baseball. In a perfectly competitive
market, a player’s salary approaches his MRP (Scully, 1974a).
To find player MRP values, Scully (1974a) used a two-equation model beginning
with a production function (to estimate individual player production and introduced in the
research topic) and then a team-revenue function. The production function consisted of
explanatory variables in the form of performance statistics, such as slugging average and
strike-to-walk ratio (discussed more in detail in the topic section of this research). The
criterion variable was win percentage (Scully, 1974a).
The team-revenue function consisted of explanatory variables, such as win percentage
and market characteristics of the ball clubs, such as the Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA) and intensity of fan interest (denoted as MARGA). MARGA was estimated by
calculating the relationship between team percent win and attendance. Scully found that most
players in Major League Baseball were exploited (player salary was less than their MRP).
The exception was mediocre players whose salaries were greater than the net MRP, which
takes into account costs other than player labor of running a business (1974a). A key
limitation of his work was that the production function omitted explanatory variables of
interest, such as stadium investment and managerial quality of the staff in the dugout who
make decision during the game such as changing pitchers.
Medoff (1976) built on the work of Scully (1974a) by changing variables to better
capture a player’s productivity, using more-recent data, and using two-stage least squares
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regression (instead of ordinary least squares) to address an endogeneity issue. He also
incorporated race as an explanatory variable in the revenue function. To improve on
capturing player productivity, Medoff (1976) used the runs scored metric for hitters because
it incorporated various offensive contributions, such as singles, doubles, triples, and stolen
bases, with their respective weights. Percentage wins (PCTWIN) was regressed onto the runs
scored metric (mentioned above) for the entire team (TRUNS), earned run average of the
team’s pitching staff (TERA), and whether a team played in the NL or not (dummy variable)
(Medoff, 1976). Medoff’s (1976) revenue function consisted of many of the same variables
as Scully’s revenue function, such as percentage wins (PCTWIN) and SMSA. Key
differences were the addition of new explanatory variables, such as percentage of non-White
players on a team (BBPCT) and age of stadium (dummy variable denoted as STD). All of the
explanatory variables in the revenue function were found to be significant at the significance
level of 0.10, with the exception of BBPCT.
Two-Stage least squares regression was utilized for estimating the revenue function
due to the possible correlation between the error term and PCTWIN in the revenue function,
thought to be plausibly based on error terms of both equations being correlated (simultaneous
relationship). Using ordinary least squares would have caused an upward bias of the
coefficient PCTWIN. Ultimately, Medoff found, similar to Scully’s findings, that players
faced monopsonistic exploitation because they received approximately 11% of their
economic worth (Medoff, 1976).
Continuing with the theme of monopsonistic exploitation by Scully (1974a) and
Medoff (1976), Haupert (2009) obtained a unique data set of financial records for the New
York Yankees for 1915-1937. This data set provided him with actual team revenue data that
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was previously unavailable and typically was proxied by variables such as attendance and
television revenue. He utilized this unique data set from the pre-free agency era to better
understand the exploitation of baseball players in the past compared to those who later earned
the right to bargain for their wages in the 1970s via free agency. He found the degree of
exploitation occurred more in situations where workers were less able to bargain for their
compensation. Although prior to 1968, teams were not required to publicize their finances,
the calculation of MRP for a baseball player followed Scully’s three-equation approach. The
Yankee’s exploitation rates over the seasons followed a parabolic path when compared to
player experience because the exploitation rate increased significantly between 1914 and
1917 but then decreased steadily through 1925 (Haupert, 2009).
Again, similar to Scully’s work on MRP estimations, Sommers and Quinton (1982)
incorporated expansion teams into the MRP analysis. Another key addition was the
utilization of interaction between SMSA and win percentage of that particular team with
SMSA. This was done to demonstrate how winning is more important for teams in larger
markets. The researchers’ two samples consisted of the first batch of free agents and nonfree
agents. The researchers estimated the cost of the player by taking the total value of the
contract and dividing its length in years. By following Scully’s two-equation method, the
researchers found that salaries for free agents approached their respective MRP values
(Sommers & Quinton, 1982).
Blass (1992) shifted from the previous philosophy of measuring rates of exploitation
and focused on the human capital model of investment. He sought to find out whether moreexperienced players were paid more solely because of their production on the field
(according to the human capital model of investment). To answer this, he utilized a new
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three-part approach to measure MRP of baseball players. The first part related offensive
statistics to runs (runs scored function). The second part related runs to winning percentage
(a production function), and the third part determined how win percentage impacted
attendance and broadcasting revenue (two separate revenue equations). The third part used
lagged variables, such as the previous season’s team win percentage of the player (Blass,
1992).
The offensive statistics utilized in the first function were singles, doubles, triples,
home runs, nonintentional walks, hit batsmen, stolen bases, grounding into double plays,
caught stealing, sacrifice flies, and outs. For the second function, the author estimated win
percentage in logit form (logarithm of the odds function), because it is difficult to transform
win percentage into a useful form when utilizing a negative binomial distribution for runs
scored. Blass then determined the necessary number of runs needed over the season to
contribute to an additional win for the specific team. For the third part, he created two
separate equations that incorporated how winning percentage uniquely impacted attendance
revenue and local broadcasting revenue for individual MLB teams (Blass, 1992).
For his data set, Blass (1992) used a cross-sectional panel data set of players with at
least 10 years of Major League Baseball experience to determine if experience and
productivity impacted salaries. Regressing deviations in real salary from a nine-year mean
onto variables such as experience and deviation from mean offensive productivity, he found
that experience played a major role in determining the dependent variable while the
introduction of the offensive variable of productivity had little impact on the dependent
variable. He found that workers initially were underpaid but were overpaid later in their
careers relative to their productivity (Blass, 1992).
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ii.) Basketball
Some 11 years after the first research began on MRP in baseball, Scott, Long, and
Somppi (1983) investigated the relationship between MRP and salary in the National
Basketball Association. The authors found that a key advantage of investigating professional
basketball players’ MRP values versus that of Major League Baseball players was a lack of
team investment in player development and training in the National Basketball Association
because college basketball teams played that role. The researchers noted that prior to a 1976
federal court ruling, players in the National Basketball Association faced restraints in selling
their services to the highest bidder. From 1976 to 1980, players gained more mobility to sell
their services to other teams. After 1980, National Basketball Association players were
granted nearly unrestricted mobility. Thus, one would expect that the level of restraint in the
market would have a negative correlation in terms of players being paid less than their MRP.
Also of interest to the authors was the possibility of racial discrimination. This could be
investigated by evaluating whether Black players were paid less than their White
counterparts of equivalent performance (Scott et al., 1983).
To address these hypotheses, the authors created two functions. The Cobb-Douglas
production function used a team’s winning percentage as its criterion variable. This was
regressed onto the following performance statistics: team field-goal percentage, opponent
field-goal percentage, team free-throw percentage, opponent free-throw percentage, team
rebounds, opponent rebounds, team assists, opponent assists, team fouls, and opponent fouls.
For a revenue function similar to Scully’s (1974a) method, team revenue was regressed onto
win percentage, population (MSA), arena capacity, Black percentage of city’s population,
per-capita income, years the team had been in the city, number of superstars on the team,
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playoff contender (dummy variable), and the percent of team players who were Black (Scott
et al., 1983).
To estimate a player’s defensive ability, variable points allowed was divided by 5 and
then multiplied by the decimal value of minutes played in a game. This assumed that each
player bore the same responsibility for points allowed based on their minutes played. The
authors acknowledged that the team defense assumption understated the value of good
defensive players and overstated the value of bad defensive players. It was found that player
salaries approached the MRP as the freedom to negotiate their contracts increased. The
researchers found no evidence of customer discrimination against Blacks as a significant
positive coefficient was detected for the variable percentage of Black players on a team in the
revenue function at the 0.01 significance level. The authors also found no evidence of racial
discrimination at the management level because race was not a significant factor in
determining a player’s salary (salary regressed onto MRP and race) at the 0.01 significance
level (Scott et al., 1983).
In 1999, Berri looked into measuring the production of National Basketball
Association players in hopes of determining who was the most valuable player. A key
improvement from previous literature was his ability to address statistics tied to an
opponent’s rebounds in a manner that would better evaluate individual player’s production as
opposed to Somppi’s (1985) assumptions that each player was equally responsible
defensively for all of an opponent’s production. Note that Berri still adjusted for team
statistics, such as opponent’s 3-point field goal percentage, by distributing it to players on the
team based directly on the percentage of minutes played divided by 5, which was the number
of players on each team who were on the court at any one time (1999).
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Berri (1999) also noted that the Cobb-Douglass production function he used failed to
isolate production of individual players from their respective teams. For example, a team that
had difficulties rebounding the ball also faced the issue of a diminished impact of scoring on
winning. Thus, identical player performances on different teams would be of different value
based on the performance of the player’s teammates. Berri (1999) also weighted each
player’s production by the team’s tempo to reduce the bias in which a team that played at a
higher tempo would naturally score more than a team that played at a slower tempo ceteris
paribus (Berri, 1999).
Berri (1999) utilized a three-stage least squares method. He began with a model that
demonstrated how wins was a function of points scored and points allowed. Using data from
the 1994-1995 and 1997-1998 seasons, he found that approximately 95% of the variation of
team wins was explained in this model. Points scored and points allowed were then regressed
onto explanatory variables, such as assist-to-turnover ratio, in a points-scored equation and a
defensive assist-to-turnover ratio in points-allowed equation. Finally, the marginal value of
each statistic was calculated by merging the two-equation system into a single-equation
model that had win percentage as the response variable and individual variables that
determine points scored and points allowed. Per-minute production was calculated by taking
the summation of the (marginal value of the statistic)*(accumulation of the statistic) divided
by the total minutes played of the individual player (Berri, 1999).
Building upon his previous work by adding performance statistics of assists and team
rebounds, Berri (2008) sought to determine the production per 48 minutes played (P48) of all
National Basketball Association players. Blocked shots and assists were determined not to fit
in defensive or offensive efficiency due to the nature of both statistics, in which there would
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be a transfer of production from one player to another. With that in mind, two key
adjustments were made involving the league average of blocked shots per team per 48
minutes being subtracted from a particular team’s average blocked shots per 48 minutes.
Likewise, the league average team assists per 48 minutes was subtracted from the team’s
average assists per 48 minutes. The two resulting numbers from these calculations were
subtracted to calculate each player’s 48-minute production. To account for the difference in
positions that were deemed to be complements of each other in the National Basketball
Association, each P48 performance was adjusted by subtracting the P48 league average of
that player’s specific position (e.g., center) (Berri, 2008).
iii.) Hockey
Some 5 years after the first research began on MRP in basketball, Jones and Walsh
(1987) estimated the MRPs of National Hockey League player participants from the 19761978 seasons. The production function regressed percentage of maximum team points onto
goals for (offensive performance), goals against (defensive performance), and team quality
(proxying managerial and coaching effectiveness). The revenue function regressed total
revenue onto percentage of maximum team points, stadium capacity, average household
income and population of the team’s city, Canada (dummy variable), and number of
competitive league sports in the city. Combining both functions, using weights to account for
expected defensive and offensive contribution of different positions in the sport, and
adjusting for other costs such as travel (nonplayer cost), they calculated the MRPs. The
authors found no evidence of exploitation of player’s salaries and attributed this to the
presence of the World Hockey Association, which was a competitor to the National Hockey
League during this time period (Jones & Walsh, 1987).
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Similarly, Bent and Sommers (2014) estimated the MRPs of National Hockey League
player participants in the league’s 2012 all-star game. They utilized a two-way recursive
function. The first function regressed points onto scoring, goals allowed, and out, which is
dummy variable that indicates whether a team is 20 or more points out of the eighth and final
playoff spot. The explanatory variable of scoring was calculated as goals plus assists divided
by the average of goals plus assists of every team in the league. Similarly, goals allowed was
calculated by the number of goals allowed by the team divided by the average goals allowed
per team in the league (Bent & Sommers, 2014).
The second function regressed revenue onto points, points*population,
point*population2, new (dummy variable indicating a new venue built within five years),
Canada (dummy variable), and two or more teams in MSA (dummy variable). The authors
evaluated the MRP of each player by first plugging the scoring into the points function to
obtain the points estimate, which they in turn plugged into the revenue function along with
the other explanatory variables in the revenue function, such as population (Bent &
Sommers, 2014). Limitations of this study included how the effects of coaching and
teammates were not accounted for in the production function.
Summary
The human capital model of investment and the concept of MRP play a role in my
research. Sommers and Quinton’s (1982) finding that free agent baseball salaries approach
MRP supports labor economics theory that peoples’ salaries approach MRP in an open,
competitive market. Thus, one could make a case that research involving unrestricted free
agent offensive linemen as the sample is giving an estimated MRP value of an NFL offensive
lineman. Further, the variable experience, which is proxied by age in my models, will be
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used as a determining factor for wage determination of NFL offensive linemen and is
representative of a trait found in the human capital model of investment.
b.) Race Discrimination (non-MRP, emphasis on wage discrimination)
While MRP estimates the true value of a player to a particular team, the topic of wage
discrimination involves finding the factors associated with what the player is paid. Unlike
studies on MRP, research on wage discrimination has been done in football. Many sports,
such as soccer, baseball, basketball, and hockey, provided opportunities for researchers to
analyze whether wage discrimination existed within the respective sport. Studies such as that
done by Bellemore (2001), which looked at possible promotion discrimination, are included
in this section because they provide similar methodologies and controls in terms of
performance statistics that are present in wage discrimination literature.
i.) Football
Mogull (1973) was the first researcher to this author’s knowledge to have investigated
wage discrimination in football. At the time of his research, data of player salaries was not
readily available, which means he resorted to sending surveys to all NFL players on the
1970-1971 rosters of teams. From the sample of 96 players who returned the questionnaires,
subgroups consisting of rookie and nonrookies and whether the player played for a southern
region team or non-southern region team were evaluated (Mogull, 1973).
For first-year Black players and White players, salary or bonuses were not
significantly different (at a 0.20 significance level) between Whites or Blacks in either the
South or non-South region. Similarly, White and Black players with one or more years of
experience did not have significant differences between salary or bonuses. When experience
was used as a proxy for playing ability, there appeared to be possible wage discrimination
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because Blacks had more playing experience in general but lower salaries than White
players. However, the effect was not found significant (Mogull, 1973)
Mogull (1981) re-evaluated the same data from his previous work using an alternative
methodology. His alternative methodology consisted of using the Chow test to study whether
the coefficients of linear regression on two separate sets of data were equal. The F stat in the
Chow test of 1.225 was not significant, indicating that football team management did not
discriminate in wages based on race (Mogull, 1981).
Following Mogull (1981), Kahn (1992) utilized data on NFL players from the 1989
season to examine the issue of wage discrimination. The log of salary, where salary was
defined as average annual compensation, was regressed onto performance variables, such as
games played and games started, and onto race variables. The race variables were of main
interest and were as follows: White (dichotomous variable), percentage of non-White
residents in a metropolitan area of the team and the interaction term of both. The variable
White was included to test for customer discrimination. Percentage non-White was assumed
to be positive because non-White players should do better in home team areas that have
higher percentage of non-White players. White players were assumed to earn more money in
areas that have a higher percentage of White residents; thus, the sum of the coefficients for
the interaction term and percentage non-White would be negative (Kahn, 1992).
Kahn ran separate regression on three different position categories, including the
offensive line, and also ran a regression that included all positions. No variables of interest
were found significant in the offensive line model. A key finding for all positions was that
players made more money playing for teams that had a higher representation of their race, as
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demonstrated by three different models having significant coefficients that followed the signs
of what the author expected (Kahn, 1992).
Gius and Johnson (2000) followed their study in 1998 about possible racial
discrimination in the National Basketball Association by taking a similar methodological
approach with the NFL. They utilized a log-linear wage equation and Chow test. Log of
salary was regressed onto variables, such as race, experience, experience2, and position
variables, such as defensive tackle and offensive tackle. They found reverse discrimination in
White players being paid 10% less (-0.10 coefficient) than Black players of similar ability
with a significant Chow test (Gius & Johnson, 2000). In a similar study with a larger sample
size and using several seasons of data, Doran and Doran (2004) found similar results, with
the exception of there being a salary premium for White quarterbacks.
Transitioning to interest in racial discrimination for a particular position, in Berri and
Simmons’ study of “Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football
League,” the authors sought to determine whether Black quarterbacks faced performancerelated discrimination (2009). Quantile regression was utilized in the salary model. Log
salary was regressed onto experience, experience2, draft round 1 (dummy variable), draft
round 2 (dummy variable), veteran (dummy variable), change team (dummy variable), Pro
Bowl participation, offense salary, log population of local MSA, career pass attempts,
passing yards, Black (dummy variable), Black*(passing yards), touchdowns per attempt,
completions per attempt, interceptions per attempt, rushing yards, and Black*(rushing yards).
The singular performance measure significant across all percentiles was passing yards. The
performance statistic of rushing yards had no significant impact on compensation throughout
all quantiles, regardless of race (Berri & Simmons, 2009).
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Thus, the skill of running as a quarterback was not compensated within the market.
Black quarterbacks (who tend to run the ball well) faced performance-related discrimination
(Berri & Simmons, 2009). A key limitation was the proxy used for evaluating the
quarterback’s teammates’ abilities, a factor known as offense salary. It consisted of the
summation of salaries for running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends.
Switching from the quarterback position to the linebacking core, Keefer (2013)
sought to identify whether racial discrimination existed for this particular position. He built
upon previous literature by focusing solely on a specific position on the defensive unit that
had not been explored, to this author’s knowledge. Quantile linear regression was utilized as
a means to analyze where discrimination (if it did exist) occurred along the continuum of
salaries for NFL linebackers. The explanatory variables of the model consisted of individual
performance statistics such as tackles and sacks. Team statistics, such as points per game and
yards allowed, were included in the model to control for the problem that poor defense
correlated with more opportunities for making tackles. Both individual and team statistics
were lagged 1 year because player contracts were to be impacted by the previous year’s
performance (Keefer, 2013). This author found that a non-Black player is compensated
significantly more than a Black linebacker ceteris paribus at the 10th and 25th percentiles.
Using an ordinary least squares model, the author found that non-Black players make on
average 10% more than Black players ceteris paribus (Keefer, 2013).
Following Keefer’s (2013) work, Burnett and Van Scyoc (2015) sought to determine
whether wage discrimination involving rookie linebackers and rookie offensive linemen
could be detected. These two positions were selected because they were relatively diverse
with a number of Whites and Blacks playing at those respective positions. Using a
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methodology similar to that used by Keefer, while using only explanatory variables such as
race and draft position, they found no significant evidence of racial discrimination (Burnett &
Van Scyoc, 2015).
ii.) Baseball
In studies of baseball, much of the wage determination is found in the MRP section of
this paper because MRP studies incorporate a wage determination component. However,
topics such as customer discrimination based on fan attendance are of interest to the author
and will be covered.
Prior to Scully’s MRP analysis, he empirically analyzed wage discrimination between
Blacks and Whites. He created racial salary functions of outfielders, infielders, and pitchers
based on performance statistics, such as lifetime slugging average for the three outfielders
position. The coefficients for performance used for infielders and outfielders were
significantly different and favored White players at the infield and outfield positions,
respectively. He argued that in order to evaluate wage discrimination, salary must be related
to performance statistics (Scully, 1973).
Scully (1974b) also argued that fan attendance was impacted negatively by games
pitched by Blacks. Using data from the 1967 baseball season, he regressed average fan
attendance onto variables such as night, weekend, and race of the home team’s starting
pitcher. Race of the home team’s starting pitcher was significant at the 0.05 level. On
average, 1,969 fewer fans attended a game pitched by Blacks versus those pitched by Whites
(Scully, 1974b).
Continuing with customer discrimination, Tainsky and Winfree (2010) investigated to
see the change in effect of a foreign-born MLB player on ticket demand from 1985-2005.
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Log of attendance was regressed onto variables, such as win percentage, lag-1 win
percentage, number of foreign players, (number of foreign players*trend), (number of foreign
players)*trend2, and matching where trend was a component to measure the change over
time. Matching was calculated by summing the product of each nationality proportion on an
MLB team with the matching nationality in the SMSA of the team. They found that from
1985-1991, foreign-born players had a negative impact on ticket demand at a diminishing
rate. In 1992, foreign-born players had a positive impact on ticket demand, and this positive
effect increased until it peaked in 2000. From then until 2005, the positive effect slightly
decreased. Matching had no significant impact (Tainsky & Winfree, 2010).
Shifting to promotion opportunities, Bellemore (2001) investigated whether
discrimination in promotion from the minor leagues (AAA league) to the major league in
baseball occurred during distinct time periods. Eleven years of data on batters from the late
1960s to the late 1990s were used. A probit equation was regressed onto statistics such as
batting average, home runs, runs batted in, stolen bases and race. In the 1960s and 1970s,
Blacks and Hispanics faced promotion discrimination. With the expansion of Major League
Baseball in the mid-1990s, promotion discrimination subsided for Blacks and was not
significant for Hispanics (Bellemore, 2001).
Using awards as a response variable, Depken and Ford (2006) sought to evaluate
customer-based discrimination in the form of baseball’s All-Star voting process from 19902000. The number of All-Star votes was regressed onto many variable types, such as race,
player quality, and voters. Within the variable type of voters, dummy variables accounted for
where a player’s team was located. The researchers found no significant effect in terms of
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(‘in terms of’…) discrimination against minorities. Fans actually displayed a bias toward
Blacks and Latinos in All-Star voting (Depken & Ford, 2006).
Jewell, Brown, and Miles (2002) also measured whether racial discrimination
impacted one’s chances of being inducted into the National Baseball Hall of Fame. Race
variables such as being Black; being born in Latin America and the interaction of those two;
performance statistics and noteworthy accomplishments, such as World Series Championship
appearances, were considered as explanatory variables. Percentage of votes received out of
total votes was the dependent variable. The dependent variable was transformed by taking the
log of percentage of votes received over percentage of votes not received because a logit chisquared method was employed. Heckman’s correction was employed on the sample to
account for no-vote players.
iii.) Soccer
Gandelman (2009) utilized data from a Uruguayan soccer league to address whether
race plays a role in media player evaluation. The dependent variable, denoted performance,
consisted of evaluations by journalists (average grades) and was regressed onto variables
such as goals, race, and education. Race was a significant factor at the 0.10 significance level
in four of the six models. He concluded that discrimination by Uruguayan media was present
against non-White players in the national league (Gandelman, 2009).
In an Italian soccer league, Bryson, Rossi, and Simmons (2014) investigated player
contributions to team wins and fan attendance and their relationship to team revenue. They
built upon previous literature by including other performance statistics beyond goals and
assists in their player productivity variable. For the salary model, log salary was regressed
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onto age, age2, experience, player productivity, team effects such as team Serie A or B,
season dummy, and nationality dummy variables (Bryson et al., 2014).
Player productivity was measured by the following performance statistics: career
goals in Serie A, career goals in Serie B, appearances in Serie A, appearances in Serie B,
minutes played, minutes played2, lost balls, recovered balls, season goals in Serie A,
goalkeeper saves, goal assist, shots on target, successful passes, tackles, fast breaks,
footballer of the year award, World Cup selection, European Championship selection. The
nationality dummy variables consisted of a dummy variable known as “local” to indicate
whether the player plays close to his hometown and “Italian” to ultimately distinguish
between local and nonlocal Italians. Using ordinary least squares and quantile regression,
they found a growing wage penalty (starting at the 50th percentile) for Italian players versus
non-Italian players as one earned higher wages (Bryson et al., 2014).
In order to explore the individual effects of change on team effects, which would
impact attendance, the attendance model was created. Log team attendance (dependent
variable) was regressed onto predicted salary (proxy for team quality), residual salary, team
points, year, nationality, and team fixed effects. Using models such as the above, the authors
determined that wage discrimination occurred in large part because fans preferred a player
being a European Union (EU) migrant (Bryson et al., 2014).
iv.) Basketball
In the National Basketball Association, Kahn and Sherer (1988) sought to identify
whether racial discrimination was present in the employment of its players. Their work built
on previous literature on wage discrimination because they were better able to control for
outside factors by utilizing data from means such as the Current Population Study. Salary
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was regressed on variables such as average minutes played, the selection number in which
the player was chosen in the National Basketball Association draft, team win percentage, and
race. The draft number of the player was used as a proxy for fan’s perceived quality of a
player. Two-Stage least squares method was employed to address a possible endogeneity
issue of the variable draft number interacting with player quality and race. The draft number
was regressed onto variables such as race and college field goal percentage. A key limitation
is that the authors used only one year of data. They found racial discrimination exists and
customer discrimination appears to be the driving factor (Kahn & Sherer, 1988).
Jenkins (1996) made a significant contribution to the wage discrimination literature in
basketball by using a new sample selection. Only free-agent National Basketball Association
players were selected for this study because Jenkins believed doing so gave a better fit
between past performance and salary. He found no significant effect for race on wages in his
model and no supporting evidence of race discrimination utilizing a Chow test (Jenkins,
1996).
Similarly, Hamilton (1997) utilized ordinary least squares and tobit (is ‘tobit’
correct?) regressions and found no difference between salaries of White players and Black
players when controlling for player performance, such as seasons played, and team
characteristics, such as a general manager being Black. However, censored quantile
regression indicated that Blacks were discriminated against in the upper end of the salary
distribution (90th percentile) (Hamilton, 1997).
Continuing with possible wage discrimination using more-recent data, Gius and
Johnson (1998) used a log-linear wage equation and also performed a Chow test. Log salary
was regressed onto race and performance variables, such as assists per game and steals per
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game. Proxies for whether a player was a free agent and for whether the player stayed on the
same team were also included as explanatory variables. Surprisingly (based on the theory that
a player’s salary approaches MRP in a free, open, competitive market), free agency had a
negative effect on player salary. Gius and Johnson (1998) conjectured that this result
occurred because of the salary cap rules in place in the National Basketball Association
limited a team’s expenditure on free agents. The Chow test was utilized to determine if the
regression parameters differed for White athletes and Black athletes in wage determination.
Both the model and Chow test found that wage discrimination was no longer prevalent in the
National Basketball Association (Gius & Johnson, 1998).
Robst, VanGilder, Coates, and Berri (2011) looked into intraracial discrimination by
introducing an objective measure of skin tone called the RGB score (used by Adobe
Photoshop) in basketball. Using unrestricted free agent players in the National Basketball
Association for a sample, a log of salary was regressed onto performance statistics, such as a
player’s points per game, racial composition of the city in which the team was based, and
skin tone, among other variables. The researchers found minor support for customer
discrimination in that lighter skinned Black players earned higher wages for teams that had a
higher representation of Hispanic and Asians but that no significant evidence of employer
discrimination was based on skin tone.
Going beyond just wage discrimination, Kahn and Shah (2005) investigated whether
race impacted salary, total compensation, and contract duration for National Basketball
Association players during the 2001-2002 season. Salary was defined as average annual
compensation (including bonuses) over the duration of the contract. Compensation was
defined as the total cash value of the entire contract. A key contribution to previous work
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performed on wage discrimination in the National Basketball Association was that they
accounted for differing negotiation rights of players being first round picks, nonfirst round
picks, and free agents. Using the negotiation rights, Kahn and Shah (2005) separated their
players according to those three groups. The log of compensation and log of salary were
regressed onto variables, such as rebounds, blocks, market variables, and race using tobit
analysis because the league has a minimum wage of $332,817. Duration was analyzed as a
dependent variable of the model using ordered probit because it is a discrete variable. The
authors found significant discrimination for nonfirst round draft selections on total
compensation, salary, and contract length by looking at the marginal effects of being White
(Kahn & Shah, 2005).
Schollaert and Smith (1987) turned their attention to customer discrimination and
sought to determine whether race played a role in attendance at National Basketball
Association games. They created four models with different dependent variables to measure
attendance as follows: total attendance, percentage of seats sold, number of unsold seats, and
per-capita attendance. The independent variables were facility characteristics and market
characteristics. Team racial composition had no significant effect on any of the attendance
models (Schollaert & Smith, 1987).
Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991) sought further to determine if fan attendance
impacted wage discrimination through their preference of watching White players on the
court. Additionally, the researchers sought to determine whether a player’s ability to be
employed by a team is determined in part because of their race (entrance discrimination)
existed. Prior to addressing the key points of interest, a salary determination equation was
created with log of salary being regressed onto variables such as race and points per minute
37

played over a lifetime. There was a significant negative coefficient on race of -0.156,
indicating that Black players’ salaries were 16% less than White players’ salaries ceteris
paribus.
To address possible customer discrimination as mentioned at the beginning of the
above paragraph, attendance was regressed onto PCTMINB, which indicated the percentage
of minutes played by Black players during the season and other variables, such as the number
of years a team has played in a particular city. The variable PCTMINB was not significant,
which indicated that no evidence was found that fan attendance was impacted by the playing
time of Black players (Brown et al., 1991).
As for finding possible entrance discrimination, the authors sought to determine
whether marginal White players were outperformed by marginally performing Black players,
based on performance statistics such as points per game and assists per game. Players were
grouped as “marginal” if they averaged 25 or fewer minutes per game. Racial performance
differentials were investigated on performance statistics, such as field goal percentage. The
researchers found weak evidence of entrance discrimination because only limitedperformance variables (points per game and points per minute) were significant for marginal
players (Brown et al., 1991).
From entrance discrimination to exit discrimination, Groothuis and Hill (2004) sought
to determine if National Basketball Association players’ careers were shortened because of
their race. They used both nonparametric and semiparametric methods. The nonparametric
method consisted of calculating hazard rates for Black and White players. Hazard rate
calculated the percentage of players who left the National Basketball Association after a
particular career length. Hazard rates for Black and White players were similar. A key
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limitation of this method was that it did not account for the productivity of the players. The
semiparametric method consisted of a logit model, which consisted of a dichotomous
dependent variable in which a player would receive a 0 for each year he did not exit the
league and a 1 when he did exit the league (panel data set). The researchers’ models
consisted of variables such as steals, blocks, height, weight, tenure, tenure2, tenure cubed,
and tenure fourth power with the likelihood function statistic.
Kanazawa and Funk (2001) used Nielsen ratings as a dependent variable to determine
whether customer discrimination existed in the National Basketball Association. Nielsen
ratings were regressed onto variables such as home team win percentage, White fan
percentage of SMSA, the number of players on the home team, the number of White players
on the visiting team, and weekend as a dummy variable. Ultimately, six models were created,
two of which were generalized least squares models, two of which were fixed-effects models,
and two of which were random-effects models. The study found that viewer ratings increased
based on greater participation of White players, even if they are on the bench (Kanazawa &
Funk, 2001).
To better understand customer discrimination in the National Basketball Association,
Burdekin, Hossfeld, and Smith (2005) measured the racial composition of an National
Basketball Association team in three ways: percentage of members on the team who were
White, percentage of starting players on a team who were White, and percentage of bench
players on a team who were White. The three measures of racial composition were used as
dependent variables for ordinary least squares regression and were regressed onto variables,
such as the percentage of White residents in the SMSA population (denoted POPWHITE). It
was found that the percentage of White starters on a team was significantly impacted by
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POPWHITE, indicating that teams cater to customer discrimination. (be sure that ‘cater to’
fairly describes this)
To determine whether White players generated additional revenue in more White
populated SMSA areas, home-game revenue was regressed onto important variables, such as
the percentage of White players on a team (denoted TWHITE), the team’s winning
percentage, and the interaction term of TWHITE*POPWHITE. In the second model, the
interaction term (what is ‘interaction term’?) was found to be positive and significant,
indicating White fans do prefer (‘prefer’ to do what?) White players (Burdekin et al., 2005).
Looking at performance-based rewards, Berri, Brook, and Schmidt (2007) turned
their attention specifically to the variable of points scored and how points scored related to
voting points for the National Basketball Association’s all-rookie team. Further, wages for
free agent basketball players, following wage determination, were calculated. For the allrookie team, the natural log of voting points was regressed onto production variables, such as
wins produced and points scored, and on other variables, such as draft position of the player.
A tobit model was used to constrain the dependent variable of voting points earned by the
rookie player. Looking at various tobit models, the researchers found points scored to be
significant and to have the most significant impact on voting points (Berri et. al., 2007).
For the wage model, Berri et al. (2007) considered only free agents. This was done to
focus on production variables at the time in which the contract would be determined. The
dependent variable was the log of the average real salary over the duration of the contract. It
was regressed onto variables such as points scored per game, rebounds per game, and wins
produced per game. Similar to results found in studying different models on voting points,
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the various salary models demonstrated that average points scored per game had the largest
significant impact on a player’s salary (Berri et al., 2007).
v.) Hockey
In hockey, Jones and Walsh (1988) sought to determine if discrimination existed with
French Canadians and their respective playing positions on the ice. Their work built upon
previous research of racial discrimination by looking into the sport of hockey. The log of
salary was regressed onto variables, such as height, weight, and the dummy variable of being
born in Quebec. Skills such as average total goals and assists per game (denoted as points per
game), which were of importance for forwards and defensemen, were found to be a major
determinant of a player’s salary. When looking at all positions, the researchers found no
significant evidence of discrimination against French Canadian players in the National
Hockey League. A key limitation of the study was that no variable was present to purely
address a player’s defensive capability (Jones & Walsh, 1988).
Similarly, Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh (1999) sought to determine if minority groups,
such as Europeans or Americans, faced wage discrimination. The log of salary was regressed
onto several variables, such as goals per game, assists per game, and ethnicity (dichotomous
variables to account for minorities). Of key interest, the researchers found that salary was
determined primarily by variables that measured productivity and skill of the player, while
ethnicity played little to no role on wage determination (Jones et al., 1999).
Summary
Depending on the sport and the study, there are a variety of models and different
results to determining whether racial discrimination in sport exists. Of key interest is
evaluating the relationship between salaries and race, controlling for performance variables.
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This is a common method utilized to determine whether wage discrimination occurs in all
types of sport. Wage, race, age, age2, position, and games started are variables used in
previous research in this section that will be evaluated in my models.
c.) Performance Statistics
In the third subcategory of individual production, performance statistics in sports
were analyzed. Key to the evaluation of performance statistics was determining how well a
statistic correlated with the production of an individual (e.g., hitting doubles to winning in
baseball). Comprehensive statistics are also of interest because these statistics can be used to
objectively evaluate all players across different positions in a particular sport. Much of the
early research occurred in baseball. Research of performance statistics in football became
prevalent in the past decade.
i.) Baseball
Lindsey (1959) evaluated the usage of statistics for decision-making processes and
player performance in baseball. Of particular interest, he investigated the shortcoming of
batting average as a measure of batting effectiveness. Batting average failed to adequately
account for productive hitting and circumstances such as a batter hitting into a double play.
Slugging percentage accounted for this first issue, making it a better measurement of a
batter’s hitting ability (Lindsey, 1959). For runs batted in (RBI), Lindsey noted how that
performance statistic was dependent on the performance of other players as well as on the
individual who batted in a teammate to score (Lindsey, 1963). Using probabilities of
situations and the expected runs in each particular situation, Lindsey created a linear-weights
model to estimate expected values of a single, double, triple, and home run hit (Lindsey,
1963).
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Cover and Keilers (1977) created a statistic known as offensive earned-run average
(OERA). This statistic gives an estimation of the number of runs per game a team would
score if its entire hitting lineup were composed of players identical to that single player. Five
assumptions were made, such as runners not advancing on outs, singles advancing a player
two bases, and a double advancing a base runner three bases. The assumptions were done so
that calculations were independent of scorer judgment. While play-by-play computation of
the OERA can be performed, the authors created a formula that they expected would give an
appropriate approximation. The formula utilized the individual performance statistics of atbats, singles, doubles, triples, home runs, and walks. After calculating the probability of each
performance statistic and denoting the 24 different states in an inning (expected run matrix),
a Markovian recurrence was established to calculate the expected runs per inning.
Multiplying that by nine innings calculated the OERA (Cover & Keilers, 1977).
More currently, comprehensive statistics such as wins above replacement (WAR)
have been employed as tools to measure overall player performance. These performance
statistics are valuable, especially if they are highly correlated with wins. Issues with WAR
include a lack of understanding of the uncertainty of the estimate and reproducibility,
because there is no standard calculation of the statistic (Baumer, Jensen, & Matthews, 2015).
From sabermetrics to labor economics, the “Moneyball Hypothesis” stemming from
Michael Lewis’ book Moneyball was based on the existence of a market inefficiency of how
the skill of batting is priced in baseball. In particular, the inefficiency was an undervaluing of
the performance of on-base percentage (OBP) versus an overvaluing of performance
statistics such as making contact on a swing. Billy Beane’s exploitation of this market
inefficiency as general manager of the Oakland Athletics helped his team compete with the
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likes of the New York Yankees, whose player payroll was almost three times that of the
Athletics (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).
Hakes and Sauer (2006) sought to test to whether the Moneyball Hypothesis was
indeed true. Win percentage was regressed onto the OBP of the team and the opponent’s
OBP. Some 82.5% of the variation of win percentage was explained by these performance
statistics. Similarly, win percentage was regressed onto team slugging percentage and
opponent’s slugging percentage. Some 78.7% of the variation of win percentage was
explained in this model. Comparing the respective coefficients of both models, the authors
noticed the coefficients in the OBP model were significantly larger than the coefficients in
the slugging percentage model (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).
Next, the authors sought to evaluate the market pricing of baseball players. The log of
salary was regressed onto performance statistics such as slugging percentage and OBP.
Dummy variables such as arbitration eligible and free agency were also incorporated because
they impact the monopsonistic exploitation of a player. The coefficient of slugging
percentage was found to be higher in the years of 2000-2003. Thus, there is an overvaluation
of slugging percentage versus OBP, as indicated by Michael Lewis in his book. In 2004, the
slugging percentage coefficient was larger than the OBP, indicating there was a market
correction (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).
Following the Moneyball Hypothesis, Gerrard (2007) evaluated the applicability of
this scenario in other sports. Prior to doing this, he used another method to evaluate whether
the Moneyball Hypothesis was indeed valid. The win-ratio was regressed onto current
payroll cost (Equation 1). Approximately 25% of the variation of the win-ratio was explained
in that model. In another model, the win-ratio was regressed onto current payroll cost, lag 1
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win-ratio, and a binary variable to account for teams that were new to the MLB (Equation 2).
This model explained approximately 37% of the variation of win-ratio (Gerrard, 2007).
With these models, one can determine a benchmark for how many games a team
should win, denoted as the benchmark, based on the team’s payroll. A statistic, Wins Above
Benchmark (WAB), was formulated. A negative WAB indicated that a team performed
below its benchmark. Total WAB was broken down into Innovation Effects and Persistence
Effects. Innovation effect was captured by the team’s residual in equation 2. Persistence
Effects, which included variables such as accrued experience captured the impact the
previous season had on WAB. It was a difference of the residual in Equation 2 less the
residual of Equation 1 (total WAB minus Innovation Effect). Over the period of 1998-2006,
the Oakland Athletics led MLB in total WAB. That statistic lent support to the belief that
Billy Beane’s staff was innovative and held a competitive advantage (Gerrard, 2007).
ii.) Soccer
Focusing their research on soccer, Weimar and Wicker (2015) investigated the
possibility of a market inefficiency in the Bundesliga. The researchers utilized probit models
and found that effort measures of total distance run and number of intensive runs per player
per match had a significant effect on the chances of winning in each separate model. The
models consisted of other team performance statistics, such as the number of yellow cards
and tackles won. In the full models (incorporating both effort measures), total distance run
was significant and positive, and the number of intensive runs was significant and negative.
The authors speculated that this was due to the high correlation between both measures (r2 =
0.86). Based on the previous findings of Wicker, Prinz, Weimar, Deutscher, and Upmann
(2013), in which effort did not have a significant impact on market value of a Bundesliga
45

player, the authors speculated that the labor market undervalued the distance that a player ran
during a soccer game (Weimar & Wicker, 2015).
Transitioning from the performance variable of effort to what is known as the
footedness of soccer players, Bryson, Frick, and Simmons (2013) regressed the log of market
valuation (a proxy for player salary) onto variables such as age, height, left foot, and two
foot. The variable of interest, two foot, was a dichotomous variable indicating that the soccer
player had equal power in both legs. To address a possible upward bias of this coefficient, the
top and bottom 5% of market valuations were removed from the data set. Two foot was
found significant at the 0.01 significance level with a coefficient of 0.171, indicating that
players were paid a premium of 17.1% increase of their salary for this ability. Creating
another model, total points was regressed onto relative average payroll, (relative average
payroll)2, and relative average share of two-footed appearances. Relative average share of
two-footed appearances was not significant, leading to the conjecture of a market
inefficiency (Bryson et al., 2013).
Also looking at performance statistics and the relation to winning, Gerrard (2007)
created a hierarchal model that consisted of team statistics and individual statistics. General
play was broken down into the components of offense and defense. Offense consisted of
score opportunities, conversion rate, and goals scored. Similarly, defense consisted of
opponent’s scoring opportunities, opponent’s conversion rate, and goals allowed. Goals
scored and goals allowed then contributed to match result (Gerrard, 2007).
Using benchmark analysis, six variables were measured as deviations from the
benchmarks. The variables were (I will send via a separate memo rules for the use of
‘include’) general play, striking, goalkeeper, offense, defense, and result. General play
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consisted of performance statistics, such as the number of passes and the rate of completed
passes. The first three variables were determined for individual play, while the other three
variables were determined or team play. Breaking these down for team over the years gives
one the ability to determine whether coaching (fitting into team effects) is of the utmost
importance to a team’s success. Gerrard found that player effectiveness was highly correlated
to the player’s wage, while team effectiveness was not. Thus, teams with limited resources
can overcome this disadvantage with a knowledge-based strategy (Gerrard, 2007).
iii.) Football
Following Gerrard (2007) in relating performance statistics to winning, but
transitioning to football, Berri (2007) found that 84% of wins in an NFL game could be
explained by points scored and points surrendered. Points scored and points surrendered then
could be regressed upon various independent variables, such as total team rushing yards
gained, passing yards gained, and opponent’s yards gained (Berri, 2007). Furthermore, the
researcher then could attribute what a player produced by specific performance statistics,
such as touchdowns thrown.
Utilizing performance statistics, such as total rushing yards of an individual player,
Simmons and Berri (2009) investigated wage determinants based on specialization versus
versatility of workers in the NFL. Their subjects were a team’s running backs (RBs). The two
components of total receiving and rushing yards were considered the focal points of
performance measures for RBs. Similar to Berri’s (2007) study, for determining which
components contributed to offensive performance in the NFL (by their respective weights),
the number of points a team scored was regressed onto several performance statistics, such as
opponent’s interceptions, opponent’s fumbles lost, plays, passing yards, rushing yards,
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interceptions, and fumbles lost. For running backs, the authors made the case that the returns
for receiving yards were more valuable than returns for rushing yards. By finding the average
number of plays to reach 100 yards receiving and 100 yards rushing, respectively, and
applying the costs associated with the number of plays it took reach those respective values,
it was estimated that 100 rushing yards produced 3.13 points and 100 yards receiving
generated 5.19 points (Simmons & Berri, 2009).
Next, the authors developed the wage determination model. Salary was measured by
pro-rating a player’s bonus over the life of the contract. Due to non-normality and excessive
kurtosis for player salaries, the authors utilized a quantile regression method for estimation of
the log salary. The explanatory variables were the player’s experience, draft round 1 and
draft round 2 (dummy variables), restricted free agent (dummy variable), veteran (dummy
variable), stayer (dummy variable), change team (dummy variable), number of Pro Bowls in
which a player was selected to, log salary of the offensive line (proxy for quality of offensive
line), log of SMSA population (proxy for market size), fullback (dummy variable), career
rushing yards, career passing receiving yards, rushing yards, passing yards, and (rushing
yards)*(passing yards), which is a key variable to examine to determine whether
specialization pays off. Specialization also paid running backs more than versatility,
especially at the higher percentiles (Simmons & Berri, 2009). A key limitation of this study
was that blocking ability of RBs was not considered.
Moving from performance statistics of a running back to a quarterback, passer rating
was one of the most widely used statistics in football. The statistic acted as a measure of
quarterback performance (von Dohlen, 2011). Stimel (2009) investigated the possibility of
structural breaks in the four variables that compose passer rating—average yards per attempt,
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completion percentage, interception percentage, and touchdown percentage—in attempts to
better understand a possible inflation of the statistic. He found structural breaks within the
time frame of 1960-2007 and argued that rule changes involving passing plays and the
formulation of the salary cap might have caused the overall change in passer rating for
particular eras. Thus, comparisons between quarterbacks of different eras should not be done
unless one accounts for these changes. Utilizing graph theory, he found evidence that the
variables average yards per attempt and interception percentage affect completion
percentage. Further studies are needed to support these interactions (Stimel, 2009).
Also focusing on passer rating, von Dohlen (2011) sought to evaluate and improve
the effectiveness of the statistic. One of the criticisms of passer rating is that it increased
steadily on average from 1940 to 2010, as cited by Stimel (2009). Dohlen (2011) proposed
two modifications. The first involved utilizing the yards per completion instead of the yards
per attempt within the model, because that would give a better balance between weighting
production and throwing accuracy. The other modification adjusted the linear scale by taking
the mean performance of the 10-year duration prior to the passer rating of that particular
year, which would adjust for the inflation of the statistic (von Dohlen, 2011).
In a study of kicking metrics, Pasteur and Cunningham-Rhoads (2014) created a new
expectation-based metric to evaluate place kickers. Instead of classic field goal percentage,
their new metric accounted for important variables such as distance of the kick and weather
conditions. Multivariate logistic regression was used to create an expected model of how a
kicker would be expected to perform under these conditions. One could then compare all
kickers’ actual success versus what the model predicted their success would have been at the
league average. Player salaries were weakly correlated (R^2 = 0.12) using the metric and Pro
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Bowl, and all pro kickers were found to be mediocre, according to the metric. Some
limitations of the study include not accounting for unusual wind patterns or psychological
pressure on the kicker. Also, sample size could be enlarged by extending the sample to a
decade worth of data (Pasteur & Cunningham-Rhoads, 2014).
In a study of offensive linemen, Alamar and Weinstein-Gould (2008) were the first
known researchers to investigate the relationship between successful pass blocking and the
completion rate of a quarterback. In their methodology, they utilized two logistic regression
equations. The first related “time in pocket” (TIP) to an individual offensive lineman and the
probability of successfully keeping the defensive lineman out of the pocket as the dependent
variable. The other equation estimated the impact of a failure by an individual offensive
lineman on the probability of the team completing the pass. The equation controlled for
variables such as down, distance of the throw, and yards necessary to earn a first down. Plays
that had penalties and designated quarterback runs were not included in the sample. Plays
that resulted in a quarterback scramble were included because TIP was reported. A key
limitation acknowledged by the authors is that they did not account for variation of the team
defenses that offensive linemen played against (Alamar & Weinstein-Gould, 2008).
iv.) Hockey
As mentioned in the author’s introduction, Idson and Kahane (2000) sought to
determine if co-worker productivity impacted the salary of individual players. The log of
salary was regressed onto individual player variables, coach variables, team variables, and
interactions between team and individual variables, such as (team points)*(individual points).
In terms of interactions, one conclusion was that a player with higher ability was rewarded
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more on teams that were more successful based on (team score)*(individual points) being
positive and significant at the 0.10 level (Idson & Kahane, 2000).
Summary
The interaction effects I captured in my models were most similar to those presented
in Idson and Kahane (2000), in which the authors looked into the interaction between team
productivity and individual productivity. Simmons and Berri (2009) demonstrated the
application of an interaction term with individual performance measures in a wage
determination model in football. The development of performance statistics in research also
enables us to further investigate possible market inefficiencies that are reflected directly in
the research of Hakes and Sauer (2006); Gerrard (2007); Bryson, Frick, and Simmons
(2013); and Weimar and Wicker (2015).
d.) NFL Combine Metrics
The literature on combine metrics at the NFL level has found mixed evidence of the
relationship between physical ability and player performance, or the round of the annual draft
in which the player is selected (Hartman (2011), Kuzmits & Adams (2008), Robbins (2010),
McGee & Burkett (2003), Dhar (2011), Berri & Simmons (2011), and Wolfson, Addona, and
Schmicker (2011). However, combine metrics do play a role as to player draft status (Sierer
et al., 2008; McGee & Burkett, 2003) Thus, it is likely that combine skills are prerequisites to
compete at elite levels (Robbins, 2010).
Prior to looking into previously cited studies, I will briefly explain the NFL Combine
and discuss the medical tests and physical metrics used there. Each year, the NFL holds an
event to evaluate the top prospects coming out of college, which is known as the NFL

51

Combine. In the combine, physical, psychological, and medical tests are performed on select
players who accept the invitation (Brophy et al., 2008).
Medical tests consist of team physicians from each organization evaluating all major
joints of the player, inquiring about missed games in college, and learning about the players’
surgical history. In addition, a 10-year history of X-rays, CAT scans, and MRIs are reviewed.
Using this information on each player, medical teams evaluate each player’s career track
(Futterman, 2017). Using medical evaluations of an anonymous NFL team from the years
1987-2000, Brophy et al. (2008) found that orthopedic grades (high, low, failure) correlate
with the number of games played.
The most common physical tests that that players perform are a 40-yard sprint,
vertical and broad jumps, 20-yard shuttle run, three-cone drill, and 225-pound bench press
(Robbins, 2011) to measure acceleration and maximum speed, jumping and change of
direction ability, and upper-body strength (Robbins, 2011). Coupling these physical tests
with past performance and focusing on running backs, Hartman (2011) evaluated a possible
relationship between players’ physical ability and past production and their ranking in the
annual draft. The only significant relationship found at the 0.05 level was between total yards
during the player’s final year of college and draft status (R = -0.66). Robbins (2011) used the
same method of correlation but expanded to include all positions in his study. Combine data
was examined in its original form and was scaled. Looking strictly at combine physical tests,
Robbins (2011) found no significant results that would link performance at the combine to
predicting future performance.
By examining only quarterbacks, running backs, and wide receivers, but looking at
draft order and games played (measurement of performance), Kuzmits and Adams (2008)
52

found that players’ vertical jump and broad jump had significant relationships in terms of
improving draft status for quarterbacks at the 0.05 significance level. For wide receiver draft
status, 10-yard and 20-yard times were significant at the 0.05 significance level. For running
back draft status, broad jump was the only significant correlation. However, at all position
levels, the researchers found no consistent relationship between combine tests and future
performance, with the exception of sprint tests for running backs (Kuzmits & Adams, 2008).
Focusing on quarterbacks and their NFL success as measured by games played and
net points, Wolfson et al. (2011) found that college and combine statistics had little value on
predicting NFL performance in their models. Their research differed from previous work
because they based their analyses on all quarterbacks drafted by NFL teams (since 1997), not
only those who have played in at least one NFL game. With similar findings, Berri and
Simmons (2011) expanded the usage of performance measurements by using criteria such as
net points, QB rating, and passing yards per attempt. The college performance metric of
completion percentage was found to have had a positive impact on future performance as
measured by NFL completion percentage at each level of experience. For a draft position
model, height, speed, and whether a player played at the D-1A level (dummy variable) were
significant. However, combine metrics and where the player was picked were found to have
no significant effect on future performance (Berri & Simmons, 2011).
Similar to research by Berri and Simmons, Dhar (2011) also investigated draft order
and performance models, but his focus was on the wide receiver position. To measure
performance, he used WR score, which encompasses total NFL receiving yards, total NFL
receiving touchdowns and years in the league. Using both ordinary least squares and a
recursive partitioning tree (CART) for the draft order model, he found that the 40-yard dash
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time was an important factor in draft position. However, college performance was more of an
overall determining factor in terms of where a player is drafted. For future performance, total
college receiving touchdowns and final college receiving yard percentage were important
factors, while combine metrics were of little importance (Dhar, 2011).
Similarly, Mulholland and Jensen (2014) used both CART and ordinary least squares
to create draft and performance models. They focused on the tight end position. Both draft
order models using CART and linear regression, respectively, gave evidence that height,
body mass index, 40-yard dash, bench press, and career college yards impact where a player
is drafted. Performance models (using NFL games started, NFL career score, and NFL career
score per game as different measures in respective models) using linear regression and
CART weight consistently show the importance of the broad jump as a factor in a player’s
future performance. However, little evidence demonstrates that the variables that
significantly impact where a player is drafted can predict performance (Mulholland &
Jensen, 2014).
While most combine measurements offer little in terms of predicting player
performance, support for vertical jump being worthwhile in the combine can be found in
research at the college level. To measure football ability, Barker et al. (1993) had college
coaches of their respective team evaluate players as starters or nonstarters (dichotomous
variable), while Sawyer, Ostarello, Suess, and Dempsey (2002), and Daniel, Brown, and
Gorman (1984) had player ability measured by coaches’ ranking. Sawyer et al.’s (2002)
study ranked all of the players on offense and defense separately, while Daniel et al. (1984)
ranked player at the position level. A player ranking of 1 was considered the highest playing
ability for the respective category; 2 was the second highest in playing ability; and so forth
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until every player was ranked. Using physical tests performed at the respective football
programs, Barker et al. (1993) and Sawyer et al. (2002) found that football ability correlated
with the test of vertical jump. Daniel et al. (1984) found that vertical jump was significant in
terms of athletic ability of offensive linemen and defensive backs.
While the literature shows that combine measures were not sufficient predictors for
player success, there is research that supports the idea that they act as signals of player ability
(Robbins, 2010). Sierer et al. (2008) found that the probability of a player being drafted by a
team was positively affected by his combine results. Furthermore, McGee and Burkett (2003)
found that the combine measures not only determined whether a player would be drafted but
also the round in which it occurred. McGee and Burkett (2003) successfully created many
prediction models based on player position. The seven models were categorized for the
positions of quarterback, wide receiver, running back, offensive line, defensive line,
defensive backs, and linebackers with combine metrics and physical characteristics as
explanatory variables. There was greater explanatory power for the wide receiver, running
back, and defensive backs model. However, the linebacker model had only an R^2-value of
0.223 (McGee & Burkett, 2003).
Summary
Based on the lack of significant results in trying to find a relationship between many
physical tests and future performance, there is skepticism about the value of the NFL
Combine. Additional suspicion comes from public outsiders based on exceptional players
such as Tom Brady ranking near the bottom of vertical jump for quarterbacks or wide
receiver star Odell Beckham Jr. ranking near the bottom on the bench press test for wide
receivers (Salfino, 2015). In the NFL, executives share similar concerns and express the need
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for other measures of player ability and performance. My research will look at NFL
performance measures to better understand what determines player salary, which is an
estimate of future player performance.
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Methodology
This chapter describes the methodology used to conduct this study. A quantitative
approach using a single-equation model was linked to relate individual statistics of offensive
linemen, such as previous regular season proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by
individual offensive linemen; individual characteristics of offensive linemen; such as race,
team statistics such as total points scored, and nonoffensive line position statistics such as
adjusted line yards, toward the determination of a National Football League (NFL) offensive
lineman’s salary. Ultimately, one is better able to identify the factors that determine the
wages of any NFL offensive lineman in the open market. This chapter is divided into four
sections: research design and procedure, population and sample, data source, and data
analysis.
Research Design and Procedure
The model presented in the study provides a foundation of what determines an
offensive lineman’s salary and if individual offensive lineman performance statistics, such as
regular season games started, impact his wages. Individual performance statistics might be
nonsignificant in the wage determination model, but team performance statistics, such as
total points scored, might be significant. This could indicate that current individual
performance statistics of offensive linemen do not adequately measure what a player at this
position contributes to winning. Thus, general managers would look at team performance
statistics as better and easier to understand estimates of the true value of an offensive
lineman. In this scenario, where there is a lack of current individual metrics, team managers
lack complete information.
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While evaluating individual offensive lineman performance of run blocking would be
optimal using individual performance statistics, individual data related to run blocking is not
available. Thus, statistics at the unit level of the entire offensive line are used, e.g., running
backs’ yards before contact (YBC), which are mentioned below in the model.
The base model most closely resembles the model in wage determination in research
by Simmons and Berri (2009) but now focuses solely on unrestricted offensive linemen
instead of on running backs. The interaction term of (proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)*(proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by other OL teammates) most closely resembles studies by Idson and Kahane
(2000).
Model 1: Wage Determination Model-All OL Positions
(M1)
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑆𝐴𝐿'( ) = 𝑎- + 𝑎/ 𝑊'((1/) + 𝑎2 𝑋'((1/) + 𝑎4 𝑌'((1/) + 𝑎6 𝑍'((1/) + 𝜓'((1/)
Where i denotes an individual player, t denotes the year, 𝑆𝐴𝐿'( is the average salary,
𝑊'((1/) is a vector of individual performance statistics, 𝑋'((1/) is a vector of individual
characteristics, 𝑌'((1/) is a vector of team performance statistics, 𝑍'((1/) is a vector of
nonoffensive line position statistics, and 𝜓'((1/) is the error term. Additionally, interaction
terms and controls are used. The interaction terms of interest are (proportion of knockdowns
on quarterbacks by individual offensive linemen)*(proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by other OL teammates) and (proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by
individual offensive linemen)*(proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by OL of new
team). The dichotomous variable of whether the player played in the same offensive scheme,
pass rush and rush defense of opponents are used as controls.
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Log of salary is used to account for salary being positively skewed in the NFL. Salary
is defined as the annual average pay of a player’s contract over the duration of a contract.
Thus, if player A were to sign a five-year, $30 million contract, the average value of that
contract would be $6 million per year. Salary is adjusted for inflation based on the hard
salary cap for that particular season.
𝑊'((1/) consists of the following variables: number of regular season games started
by an individual offensive lineman, proportion of penalties committed by an individual
offensive lineman, and proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive
lineman. To calculate the proportion of penalties committed by an individual offensive
lineman, the total number of penalties on a particular offensive lineman are divided by the
total number of offensive snaps in which the offensive lineman participated during the
regular season. Similarly, to calculate proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by an
individual offensive lineman, the regular season number of knockdowns on quarterbacks by
an individual offensive lineman would be divided by the total number of offensive pass plays
in which an individual lineman was involved during the regular season.
In terms of coefficients that are assumed to be negative--proportion of penalties
committed, proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks--are individual performance statistics
related to not making mistakes, in which higher values reflect negatively on a player’s
ability. In particular, a lower proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual
offensive lineman would seem to indicate that the offensive lineman is doing a good job in
pass protection because he is not responsible for allowing an opposing defender to hit the
quarterback. In terms of proportion of penalties committed by an individual offensive
lineman, penalties could be called during pre-snap (before a play begins), during a play, or a
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after a play. A typical pre-snap penalty might be false start, while holding might be a typical
penalty during a play. Unnecessary roughness could be a penalty that occurs after the play
ends. Whatever the scenario, penalties on players reflect errors on that particular individual.
Thus, a higher proportion of penalties committed by an individual offensive lineman
indicates that the player is more prone to mistakes and would be expected to be paid less
because he is inhibiting the offensive unit from successfully moving the ball down the field.
The coefficient of the number of regular season games started by an individual
offensive lineman is expected to be non-negative. The variable itself ranges in values from 0
(no games started) to 16, which would be the full regular season number of NFL games. The
number of games started demonstrates player quality and availability, which is valued by an
NFL team.
𝑋'((1/) consists of the following variables: age, race, overall pick, and position. Age
acts as a proxy for experience, which can be a factor in improving one’s skills but also could
contribute to a deterioration in skill, because the offensive line position is a form of highly
skilled manual labor. Age is expected to have a negative coefficient because each additional
year decreases the player’s salary from his peak production year, which could coincide with
the year he becomes a free agent. Age squared is incorporated in the model and is used to
determine if there is a nonlinear decrease in player salary. Overall pick, in which a player is
selected in the NFL draft acts as a proxy for talent level. Overall pick is expected to be
negative because a larger number indicates that a player was drafted in later rounds.
For position, centers are paid less and offensive tackles are paid the most with the
position of guard being in the middle. This is conjectured based on the opinion that the most
athletic offensive linemen play at the offensive tackle position. For race, non-White or
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Hispanic (dichotomous variable) are included in the model because sport gives one the
unique ability to investigate racial discrimination empirically. Race is not expected to play a
role in the wage determination of an offensive lineman because an open, competitive market
would bid away discrimination.
𝑌'((1/) consists of the following variables of interest: rushing yards, passing yards,
and total points scored. 𝑍'((1/) consists of the following variables of interest: adjusted line
yards, running backs’ yards before contact and average yards per carry, power percentage,
location run proportion, and stuff percentage by the offensive lineman’s team. A greater
number of rushing yards, passing yards, and points scored indicate good performance of the
team unit, which reflects positively on an offensive lineman’s contribution. Similarly, a
larger adjusted line yards, running backs’ yards before contact and average yards per carry,
and power percentage indicate a successful unit on offense. A higher location run proportion
indicates a team’s tendency to run behind or near a particular offensive lineman, which
would reflect his strength in terms of being a run blocker relative to his fellow offensive
linemen. Thus, the coefficients mentioned above in 𝑌'((1/) and 𝑍'((1/) , with the exception
stuff percentage are expected to be non-negative.
A higher value of stuff percentage, which indicates the percentage of runs in which a
running back gains no yards or is tackled for a loss, implies a higher failure rate of the
offensive line as a unit. Thus, it is expected to have a negative coefficient. For calculating
running backs’ yards before contact, a weighted average for running backs only is calculated
for each particular team because rushes performed by wide receivers tend to occur rarely and
as a form of deception (e.g., wide receiver reverse), and rushes by a quarterback often are not
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the design of a play (e.g., quarterback scrambles) or are not of interest to the researcher (e.g.,
quarterback sneaks) as an evaluation tool for OL.
For the pass control variable, a higher value indicates a higher level of difficulty of
opponent pass rush ability over the course of the season, which would reflect positively on an
offensive lineman’s ability to pass block. Pass control will be calculated as follows:
Step 1: Find all knockdowns on the quarterback of a particular team for an entire
season.
Step 2: Estimate total pass plays (pass attempts + sacks) made against that team for
the entire season.
Step 3: Take total knockdowns on quarterback of a particular team and divide by
total pass plays.
Step 4: Repeat this for all 32 NFL teams.
Step 5: Find league average pass rush percentage for the particular season
(summing up all pass rush percentages of individual teams and dividing by
32).
Step 6: Take team average pass rush percentage, and subtract the league average
rushing percentage (denote it as normalized average pass rush percentage).
Step 7: Using the new statistic above, take the summation of all opponents
“normalized average pass rush percentage” that a particular team plays
against (division opponents will be counted twice, because teams play
division opponents twice each season), and divide by 16.
A positive coefficient for proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by OL of new
team is expected because teams that are struggling to protect their quarterback would value a
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particular offensive lineman more than teams that were successful at protecting their
quarterback. Scheme (a dichotomous variable) is expected to have a positive coefficient as an
offensive lineman playing in the same scheme indicates that the player’s skill set is a good
match for what the team asks of its offensive lineman.
Other coefficients that are expected to be negative are: run control and proportion of
knockdowns on quarterbacks by other OL teammates. A lower value of run control would
indicate a higher-level difficulty of opponent run defense for the OL over the course of the
season. Run control is calculated as follows:
Step 1: Find rushing defense by calculating running backs’ weighted average YBC
per each team that an individual offensive lineman started against, and find
the average of NFL team per particular season.
Step 2: Take each team’s running backs’ weighted average YBC, and from it,
subtract the league average running backs’ weighted average YBC of that
year.
Step 3: Take the sum of the “normalized” values together (up to 16 values), and
divide by the number of previous regular season games started by that
particular offensive linemen.
The coefficient of other knockdowns allowed proportion is expected to be negative
because poor play by one’s teammates would hurt the overall production of the offensive line
as a unit. This would reflect poorly on the offense as a whole and on the individual offensive
lineman. Other knockdowns allowed proportion will be computed as follows:
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Step 1: Take the summation of all knockdowns on quarterback allowed by all
offensive linemen on a particular team for a particular year, with the
exception of the individual offensive lineman being evaluated.
Step 2: Take the given value from step 1, and divide it by the total offensive pass
plays for the team in that year (estimated as pass attempts + sacks) in which
the individual player participated.
With regards to interaction terms, a positive coefficient on (proportion of
knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)*(proportion of
knockdowns on quarterbacks by OL of new team) or proportion ratio new = (proportion of
knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)/(proportion of knockdowns
on quarterbacks by OL of new team) would indicate that teams place greater value on an
offensive lineman who has the same pass-blocking ability as the unit that they played on
during the previous season. A negative coefficient would indicate that teams place greater
value on an offensive lineman who has better pass-blocking ability relative to the new team’s
pass protection.
A positive coefficient on the interaction term of (proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)*(proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by other OL teammates) or proportion ratio current = (proportion of
knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)/(proportion of knockdowns
on quarterbacks by other OL teammates), would indicate that an individual offensive lineman
is positively compensated by playing at the same level as his teammates. Negative
coefficients on the terms would indicate that an individual OL is positively compensated by
being better in pass protection relative to his teammates.
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Other models are illustrated below to address the heterogeneity due to the position.
M2 will focus solely on the position of tackles, M3 on guards, and M4 on centers. Thus, M2,
M3, and M4 will have the same explanatory variables as the M1 model. This is of interest
because certain metrics might better capture a particular position’s value.
Models 2, 3, and 4: Wage Determination Model of Particular Positions
(M2, M3, M4)
𝐿𝑂𝐺:𝑆𝐴𝐿';( < = 𝑡- + 𝑡/ 𝑊';((1/) + 𝑡2 𝑋';((1/) + 𝑡4 𝑌';((1/) + 𝑡4 𝑍';((1/) + 𝛼';((1/)
Where j denotes whether player i is a tackle, guard, or center at time t, 𝑆𝐴𝐿';( is the
average salary, 𝑊';((1/) is the vector of individual performance statistics, 𝑋';((1/) is the
vector of individual characteristics, 𝑌';((1/) is the vector of team performance statistics, and
𝑍';((1/) is the vector nonoffensive line position statistics, and 𝛼';((1/) is the error term.
Additionally, proportion ratio new, proportion ratio current, scheme, and interaction terms of
(proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)*(proportion
of knockdowns on quarterbacks by other OL teammates) and (proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)*(proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by OL of new team) at time t-1 are evaluated.
Population and Sample
The population consists of all offensive linemen in the NFL. The sample consists of
offensive linemen in the NFL from the years of 2010-2015 who were unrestricted free agents
and who signed contracts (not franchise tag or transition tag) in the subsequent years of
2011-2016.
When NFL rookies are drafted, the team that drafted him owns his rights. Thus, the
player would sign only with that team unless the team relinquishes the rights to him via trade
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or release. Unrestricted free agents, unlike rookies who are drafted, unrestricted free agents
have the opportunity to sell their services to all 32 NFL teams, assuming they were not
designated with what the NFL calls a franchise tag or transition tag. In order to capture a
more competitive market that better identifies a player’s true value, only unrestricted free
agent OL are evaluated.
Data Source
STATS LLC provides data on regular season knockdowns on quarterbacks by an
individual offensive lineman, running backs’ yards before contact, team yards before contact
allowed (to calculate run control), team defensive knockdowns on quarterbacks (to calculate
pass control), regular season penalties committed by individual offensive linemen, and
offensive snaps (seasons 2013-2015). Pro Football Reference provides data on the number of
regular season games started by individual offensive linemen (including position started) and
run direction, which is used to calculate the location run proportion metric, and team passing
attempts and rushing attempts, which is used to calculate the run-to-pass ratio. Additionally,
Pro Football Reference provides the offensive schemes of the particular teams. Football
Outsiders provides adjusted line yards, running backs’ average yards per carry, power
percentage, and stuff percentage of respective teams. NFL.com provides pictures of
individual players to determine race, game data on passing attempts, rushing attempts, and
sacks to estimate offensive snaps for applicable years. Spotrac is used to provide wages and
ages of NFL OL at the time of their signing of a free agent contract for the upcoming season.
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Data Analysis
Ordinary least squares with clustered standard errors is utilized in multiple linear
regression analysis for all of the models. The team that signed the player in unrestricted free
agency acts as a cluster to control for possible team effects.
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Results
A total of 391 year ´ player observations were collected from 244 free-agency NFL
offensive linemen who played from 2011 to 2016. There was missing data from some of the
observations for reasons such as the free agent offensive lineman not playing a single
offensive snap the previous season prior to becoming a free agent. Table 1 illustrates the
summary statistics gathered for the response variable and all variables of interest.1
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

2.581*106

Standard
Deviation
2.532*106

Adjusted salary

391

7.000*105

1.220*107

Individual knockdowns
allowed proportion

290

0.022

0.017

0

0.110

Games started

375

8.035

6.548

0

16

Individual proportion of
plays with a penalty

289

0.008

0.007

0

0.057

Team rushing yards

373

1815.338

322.654

1.204*103

2.762*103

Team passing yards

373

3716.968

602.688

2.434*103

5.444*103

Team points scored

373

361.274

70.433

1.930*102

6.060*103

Proportion ratio current

281

0.246

0.206

0

1.575

Proportion ratio new

282

0.213

0.168

0

1.067

Adjusted line yards
(ALY)

280

3.942

0.315

2.930

4.950

One big regression (OBR) model was created considering all explanatory variables in a
single model but was not included in the results section because of multicollinearity issues.
Tables for comparison of the OBR model and selected models in the results section are
included in Appendix A.
1
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Variables

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Yards before contact
(YBC)

280

1.926

0.292

1.110

2.820

Average yards per carry
(AYPC)

280

4.155

0.401

2.950

5.670

Power percentage

280

62.311

8.678

37

83

Stuff percentage

280

19.657

2.930

12

27

Location run proportion

218

0.468

0.128

0.160

0.833

Run-to-pass ratio

367

0.793

0.162

0.487

1.323

Adjusted salary is our response variable of interest. The log of adjusted salary is used
as the dependent variable in the models. As for the independent variables, in the models
below, the proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman
will be referred to as “individual knockdowns allowed proportion,” the number of regular
season games started by an individual offensive lineman will be referred to as “games
started,” and the proportion of penalties committed by an individual offensive lineman will
be referred to as “individual proportion of plays with a penalty.” These variables capture the
individual performance of an offensive lineman. Regular season rushing yards, passing yards,
and total points scored by the offensive lineman’s team measure group performance. They
are denoted in the models as “Team rushing yards,” “Team passing yards,” and “Team points
scored.” The proportion ratio current and the proportion ratio new variables address whether
relative performance of NFL offensive linemen affect an individual’s wages. ALY, running
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backs’ YBC and AYPC, power percentage, and stuff percentage account for other players’
performance. Run proportion and run-to-pass ratio consider play selection.
Based on Table 1, the average proportion of knockdowns allowed by an individual in
pass plays is 0.022, while penalty proportion is 0.008, demonstrating a low occurrence of
these particular events for offensive linemen who reach free agency. Also, teams on average
move the ball twice as far by passing versus running the football. Not surprisingly, average
team pass attempts is a greater number than run attempts, based on the mean run-to-pass ratio
being lower than 1.
Individual Player Performance and Wage Determination
This section explores the relationship between individual player performance and
wage determination. All measurements of individual player performance significantly affect
the salary of an NFL offensive lineman, regardless of position, at the significance level of
0.10. The three metrics used are regular season penalty proportion, games started, and the
individual knockdowns allowed proportion. The first metric indicates how well offensive
linemen avoid being penalized. The second measures overall quality and availability of the
player, while the third measures an individual’s ability to pass-block effectively. General
managers determine wages of offensive linemen, in part because of their individual
performance and productivity.
Effect on Salary of Knockdowns Allowed
From a labor productivity standpoint, as the individual knockdowns allowed
proportion increases, offensive linemen are less productive. Thus, this variable is expected to
create a negative impact on salary. Following the author’s expectations, the individual
knockdowns allowed proportion has a significant negative effect on a player’s open market
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salary at the 0.05 significance level, regardless of position.2 Table 2 indicates that if the
proportion of knockdowns allowed on a quarterback increases by one standard deviation
(0.017), adjusted salary decreases between 13.2% of a standard deviation ($334,186) and
20.6% of a standard deviation ($521,533).
From a practical standpoint, offensive linemen act as insurance on quarterbacks. The
fewer times a quarterback is hit, the less likely they are to be injured. This means that general
managers value and reward offensive linemen who are able to successfully pass-block and
limit the number of knockdowns on their quarterback. Furthermore, considering the average
yearly salary for the top 20 paid quarterbacks in 2016 is roughly $21.6 million dollars or
13.9% of the total salary cap (spotrac.com), general managers pay a high premium to
offensive linemen who are able to protect their prized possession.
Table 2
Effect on Salary of the Proportion of Individual Knockdowns Allowed
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Individual knockdowns
allowed proportion

-0.206***
(-2.93)

-0.175***
(-2.25)

-0.132**
(-2.21)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.137**
(-2.04)

-0.176**
(-2.42)

-0.097*
(-1.68)

Other knockdowns
allowed proportion

-0.243***
(-3.77)

-0.225***
(-3.21)

-0.159***
(-2.82)

Position guard

0.020
(0.21)

0.014
(0.13)

0.023
(0.27)

Position tackle

0.130
(1.21)

0.143
(1.21)

0.117
(1.28)

2

Alternative specifications included interaction components and clustered standard errors but
found no statistical significance, and the results remain unchanged.
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Variables
Same scheme

(1)
0.104
(1.65)

(2)
0.085
(1.25)

(3)
0.059
(1.08)

Age

-0.206***
(-3.20)

-0.271***
(-3.87)

-0.254***
(-4.48)

Overall pick

-0.232***
(-3.63)

-0.213***
(-3.06)

-0.130**
(-2.32)

176
0.248

0.435***
(7.19)
230
0.361

Games started
Observations
R squared

204
0.245

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Games Started
For two reasons, it is expected that the variable of games started would have a
positive effect on the salary of an offensive lineman. An offensive lineman starting games
demonstrates durability and quality of play for that individual. Table 3 on the following page,
shows that the number of regular season games started by an individual offensive lineman
has a significant positive effect on a player’s open market salary at the 0.01 significance
level.3 Specifically, a standard deviation increase in the number of games started (6.5)
increases a player’s adjusted salary by 55.6% of a standard deviation ($1,407,634).
Considering that there are 16 games during the regular NFL season, 6.5 games started
is roughly 40% of the entire season. With such a short regular season, each game has
heightened importance in terms of whether a team makes the playoffs or not. The cliché

3

Game started*position was insignificant in both models.
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statement, “The number one ability is availability” appears to hold true for offensive
linemen, based on the large beta coefficient in the results.
Table 3
Effect on Salary of Games Started
Variables
Games started

(1)
0.556***
(11.64)

(2)
0.556***
(11.68)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.095*
(-1.88)

-0.095*
(-1.93)

Position guard

-0.003
(-0.04)

Position tackle

0.052
(0.69)

Same scheme

0.079*
(1.70)

0.079*
(1.71)

Age

-0.179***
(-3.76)

-0.178***
(-3.78)

Overall pick

-0.149***
(-3.08)

-0.149***
(-3.09)

301
0.381

0.054
(1.09)
301
0.381

Tackle
Observations
R squared

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Effect on Salary of Penalties
Linemen who are less prone to being penalized are more productive overall on the
field. Thus, it is expected that individual proportion of plays with a penalty would have a
negative impact on the salary of an offensive lineman. Following expectations, Table 4
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illustrates that the previous regular season penalty proportion denoted “Pen/Plays” has a
significant negative effect on a player’s open market salary at the 0.01 significance level. A
standard deviation increase in the penalty proportion (0.0075) decreases a player’s adjusted
salary between 14.4% of a standard deviation ($364,567) and 22.3% of a standard deviation
($564,572).
Further evaluating, the goal of a team’s offense is to continuously “move the chains,”
which means that the team on offense gets a first down. Repeatedly gaining first downs gives
the offense a greater chance to score. Additionally, it allows the team’s defense to be wellrested and can tire the opponent’s defense. Considering that it takes an offense moving the
ball 10 yards forward to earn a first down in a total of four downs, a holding penalty of 10
yards by an offensive lineman doubles the necessary distance necessary to successfully move
the chains. Thus, general managers clearly take note of these types of errors when evaluating
offensive linemen.
Table 4
Effect on Salary of Penalties
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Individual proportion
of plays with a penalty

-0.195***
(-2.85)

-0.144*
(-1.96)

-0.223***
(-3.48)

Pass control

-0.124*
(-1.90)

-0.118*
(-1.71)

-0.123*
(-1.95)

Run control

0.112*
(1.72)

0.170**
(2.47)

0.133**
(2.09)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.122*
(-1.79)

-0.136*
(-1.90)

-0.116*
(-1.77)

Position guard

0.019
(0.20)

0.022
(1.21)

0.044
(0.48)
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Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Position tackle

0.150
(1.48)

0.165
(1.52)

0.111
(1.14)

Same scheme

0.086
(1.33)

0.070
(1.03)

0.035
(0.56)

Age

-0.209***
(-3.19)

-0.271***
(-3.85)

-0.187***
(-2.93)

Overall Pick

-0.275***
(-4.23)

-0.250***
(-3.60)

-0.271***
(-4.33)

Observations
R squared

208
0.213

180
0.239

229
0.183

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Team Performance and Wage Determination
This section explores the relationship between team performance and wage
determination. Team performance positively impacts the wages of an NFL offensive
lineman, regardless of position. Team rushing yards is a product of a variety of skills at
different positions, such as the elusiveness of the running back and the ability of his
teammates, especially offensive linemen, to run-block for him. Likewise, team passing yards
is a product of the skills of many players, such as an offensive line’s ability to pass-block for
the quarterback; a quarterback’s ability to throw accurately; and the ability of wide receivers,
tight ends, and running backs to get open and catch the ball. Even more pieces come into
play because points scored is the sum of many components, such as field position, special
teams, and the ability of the offense to move the ball and ultimately score. Ultimately, higher
team performance is valued by a general manager when determining salary.
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Effects on Salary of Passing and Rushing Yards
Both team rushing yards and passing yards measure different aspects of offensive
production in terms of moving the ball successfully. Thus, it is expected that both have a
positive effect on the salary of an offensive lineman. According to Table 5, a standard
deviation increase in team rushing yards (323) improves the adjusted salary of a player
between 19.6% of a standard deviation ($496,216) and 28.6% of a standard deviation
($724,070), while an increase of a standard deviation of team passing yards (603) beta
coefficient is between 10.7% ($270,894) and 21.0% ($531,660). Total rushing yardage has a
greater impact on salary than passing yards, when comparing the coefficients of each model
separately.
However, by examining statistics from the 2016 NFL season, teams pass the ball on
average 58% of the time, and the average total passing yards per team is roughly 2.21 times
that of total rushing yards. Taking the ratio of total passing yards to rushing yards into
consideration, it appears that general managers might value passing yards as much or even
more than rushing yards (by multiplying the coefficient of team passing yards by 2.21). This
would support the idea of offensive linemen being particularly valued for their ability to
protect the quarterback because it is primarily the quarterback who throws the ball on pass
plays.
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Table 5
Effects on Salary of Passing and Rushing Yards
Variables
Team rushing yards

(1)
0.262***
(4.07)

(2)
0.286***
(4.16)

(3)
0.196***
(4.14)

Team passing yards

0.210***
(3.17)

0.201***
(2.80)

0.107**
(2.23)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.121*
(-1.81)

-0.124*
(-1.74)

-0.085*
(-1.72)

Position guard

-0.025
(-0.27)

-0.016
(-0.16)

-0.012
(-0.17)

Position tackle

0.047
(0.48)

0.065
(0.63)

0.033
(0.45)

Same scheme

0.097
(1.55)

0.075
(1.12)

0.070
(1.54)

Age

-0.202***
(-3.14)

-0.257***
(-3.72)

-0.185***
(-3.99)

Overall pick

-0.289***
(-4.48)

-0.284***
(-4.05)

-0.163***
(-3.43)

Games started
Observations
R squared

0.581***
(12.36)
208
0.228

180
0.254

301
0.418

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Points Scored
It is expected that total team production reflects well on the individual productivity of
an offensive lineman. Thus, the metric of team points scored would have a positive
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significant effect on the salary of an offensive lineman. Following the researcherr’s
expectations, team points scored has a positive impact on the salaries of NFL offensive
linemen at the significance level of 0.01. According to Table 6, a standard deviation increase
in team points scored (70) improves an offensive lineman’s adjusted salary from 21.4% of a
standard deviation ($541,787) to 31.6% of a standard deviation ($800,022), depending on the
model.
Furthermore, the average team in 2016 scored 364 points per game. Using the 2016
Miami Dolphins as an average offense, which scored 363 points, a 70-point increase would
move them from 17th in team points scored to fourth in the NFL (Pro Football Reference).
With such a jump, we might expect a larger increase in salary. However, team points scored
has many variables to consider, such as the quality of play of the quarterback, running back,
and wide receiver. Thus, the relatively small increase could be due to this metric’s lack in
precision with regards to measuring an individual offensive lineman’s actual play.
Table 6
Effect on Salary of Points Scored
Variables
Team points scored

(1)
0.311***
(4.99)

(2)
0.316***
(4.72)

(3)
0.214***
(4.77)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.113*
(-1.70)

-0.123*
(-1.74)

-0.078
(-1.95)

Position guard

-0.003
(-0.03)

0.007
(0.08)

0.021
(0.31)

Position tackle

0.087
(0.91)

0.102
(1.00)

0.054
(0.74)

Same scheme

0.101
(1.61)

0.077
(1.16)

0.080*
(1.79)
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Variables
Age

(1)
-0.183***
(-2.88)

(2)
-0.233***
(-3.41)

(3)
-0.187***
(-4.06)

Overall pick

-0.281***
(-4.44)

-0.276***
(-4.03)

-0.159***
(-3.40)

180
0.260

0.566***
(12.26)
301
0.426

Games started
Observations
R squared

208
0.239

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Relative Performance and Wage Determination
This section explores the relationship between relative performance and wage
determination. Relative performance has mixed results in the determination of wages. On one
hand, the difference between a player’s proportion of knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks
and his offensive line teammates has no impact on the individual player’s salary. Thus,
whether an offensive lineman’s performance is distinct from his teammates is not of
importance in determining his salary. However, the difference in knockdown proportion
between a player and his new team has a significant negative effect on salary. A player
whose pass-blocking performance is better relative to his new team is compensated more
ceteris paribus.
Effect on Salary of the Difference between a Player’s Proportion of Knockdowns
Allowed on Quarterbacks and His Offensive Line Teammates
It is thought by the author that a difference between a player’s proportion of
knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his offensive line teammates would have an impact
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on salary because the offensive line works as a singular unit. However, to the author’s
surprise, proportion ratio current is not significant at the significance level of 10%. Table 7
illustrates that there is no relationship in wage determination between player pass-blocking
performance and teammate pass-blocking proportion.
This indicates that a general manager is not influenced by the play of an individual
offensive lineman’s teammates in pass blocking. In other words, the pass-blocking ability of
individual offensive linemen is being separately evaluated from his teammates. Thus, a star
left tackle on the open market who excels in pass blocking will be compensated the same
whether on a team with fellow OL teammates who are also great at pass blocking or with
teammates who are poor at pass blocking.
Table 7
Effect on Salary of the Difference between a Player’s Proportion of Knockdowns Allowed
on Quarterbacks and His Offensive Line Teammates
Variables
Proportion ratio current

(1)
-0.072
(-0.98)

(2)
-0.021
(-0.26)

(3)
-0.061
(-0.98)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.142**
(-2.02)

-0.155**
(-2.05)

-0.095
(-1.58)

Pass control

-0.158**
(-2.37)

-0.161**
(-2.25)

-0.121**
(-2.14)

Position guard

0.030
(0.30)

0.006
(0.05)

0.047
(0.55)

Position tackle

0.123
(1.09)

0.111
(0.90)

0.136
(1.45)

Same scheme

0.119*
(1.78)

0.102
(1.43)

0.067
(1.19)
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Variables
Age

(1)
-0.197***
(-2.91)

(2)
-0.260***
(-3.56)

(3)
-0.257***
(-4.38)

Overall pick

-0.257***
(-3.82)

-0.221***
(-3.04)

-0.143**
(-2.46)

176
0.183

0.472***
(7.89)
225
0.334

Games started
Observations
R squared

204
0.163

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5. Proportion ratio current = (proportion of knockdowns
on quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)/(proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by other OL teammates).
Effect on Salary of the Difference between the Player’s Proportion of
Knockdowns Allowed on Quarterbacks and His New Team
It is expected by the author that the greater the relative quality differential between
individual knockdowns allowed proportion and new team knockdowns allowed proportion,
the greater the wage would be for the individual lineman. Thus, the variable proportion ratio
new (defined in the table notes) would have a negative coefficient. Following the author’s
expectations, the values in the first row of Table 8 illustrate that proportion ratio new is
negative and significant at the 0.10 level in all models. If proportion ratio new increases by
one standard deviation (0.168), adjusted salary decreases between 17.5% of a standard
deviation ($443,050) and 10.6% of a standard deviation ($268,362). Thus, there is a salary
penalty for players with a relatively higher proportion of knockdowns allowed in the
previous season when compared to their performance with their new team.
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Alternatively, we could state that an offensive lineman who excels in pass blocking
relative to his new team will be paid more. From a labor economics perspective, this makes
sense in the open market because a team that struggles to protect its quarterback would have
a greater need to address this aspect of their team. Signing an offensive lineman in free
agency is one way for an organization to address this deficiency.
Table 8
Effect on Salary of the Difference between the Player’s Proportion of Knockdowns
Allowed on Quarterbacks and His New Team’s Proportion of Knockdowns Allowed on
Quarterbacks
Variables
Proportion ratio new

(1)
-0.167**
(-2.37)

(2)
-0.175**
(-2.29)

(3)
-0.106*
(-1.71)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.139**
(-2.01)

-0.171**
(-2.31)

-0.091
(-1.54)

Pass control

-0.142**
(-2.14)

-0.134*
(-1.88)

-0.113**
(-2.00)

Position guard

0.054
(0.54)

0.047
(0.44)

0.051
(0.60)

Position tackle

0.162
(1.51)

0.188
(1.63)

0.147
(1.60)

Same scheme

0.119*
(1.82)

0.098
(1.40)

0.072
(1.27)

Age

-0.202***
(-3.03)

-0.274***
(-3.80)

-0.262***
(-4.49)

Overall pick

-0.258***
(-3.88)

-0.223***
(-3.13)

-0.142***
(-2.46)

Games started

0.457***
(7.58)
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Observations
R squared

205
0.183

177
0.208

226
0.339

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5. Proportion ratio new = (proportion of knockdowns on
quarterbacks by an individual offensive lineman)/(proportion of knockdowns on quarterbacks
by OL of new team).
Individual Performance of Nonoffensive Line Positions and Wage Determination
This section explores the relationship between performance of nonoffensive line
positions and wage determination. Using a variety of metrics, such as adjusted line yards
(illustrated below in the following paragraph), many of the performance variables have a
positive significant impact. Players such as running backs who contribute on a rushing play
impact the salary of an offensive lineman, regardless of position, and general managers look
at joint productivity as a factor when determining a player’s salary.
Effect on Salary of Adjusted Line Yards
Adjusted Line Yards (ALY) is a unique metric developed by Football Outsiders that
assigns credit to the offensive line on carries by a running back. A larger ALY indicates a
more successful run-blocking offensive line. Thus, ALY is expected to have a positive
impact on salary and should be a better evaluator of an offensive lineman’s run blocking
ability than average yards per carry (AYPC). Following the positive correlation expectations,
Table 9 illustrates a positive significant effect on salary of an offensive lineman at the 0.01
significance level. A standard deviation increase in ALY (0.32) would improve the player’s
adjusted salary between 21.4% of a standard deviation ($541,787) and 23.4% of a standard
deviation ($592,421).
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The unstandardized coefficients of ALY are 1,691,000 and 1,850,000, respectively.
Thus, a one-unit increase in ALY will increase an offensive lineman’s salary between those
two values, depending on the model. Comparing the unstandardized coefficients of the
AYPC are 1,398,000 and 1,448,000 based on standardized coefficients calculated in Section
4.4.3, it appears that ALY might indeed be a better evaluator of run-blocking ability because
the value of the ALY coefficient is greater than AYPC.
Table 9
Effect on Salary of ALY
Variables
ALY

(1)
0.234***
(3.64)

(2)
0.219***
(3.26)

(3)
0.214***
(3.92)

Run control

0.110*
(1.71)

0.175**
(2.59)

0.106*
(1.94)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.165**
(-2.45)

-0.155**
(-2.18)

-0.114**
(-1.98)

Position guard

-0.021
(-0.22)

-0.020
(-0.20)

0.002
(0.02)

Position tackle

0.040
(0.41)

0.076
(0.73)

0.070
(0.83)

Same scheme

0.073
(1.14)

0.065
(0.97)

0.019
(0.35)

Age

-0.190***
(-2.94)

-0.253***
(-3.66)

-0.243***
(-4.31)

Overall pick

-0.279***
(-4.32)

-0.254***
(-3.71)

-0.166***
(-2.96)

180
0.253

0.483***
(8.59)
230
0.369

Games started
Observations
R squared

208
0.216
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Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Running Backs’ Yards before Contact (YBC)
It is expected by the author that running backs’ YBC would have a positive
significant effect on the salary of an offensive lineman because it reflects a player’s ability to
maintain a run block. Table 10 demonstrates that YBC has a significant positive effect on
salary at the significance level of 0.05. In particular, Model 1 suggests that YBC has a lesser
effect on the salary of an offensive tackle versus the salary of a center, based on the
significant interaction effect at the 0.10 significance level. From a general management
perspective, they value offensive tackles more based on their pass-blocking than runblocking ability versus centers. In light of the above results of Model 1, an NFL where
passing is more common than running the football and considering that 15 of the top 20 paid
offensive linemen based on average salary of 2016 were offensive tackles, while only one
center made the top 20 list, we have further evidence of offensive linemen being more valued
for their pass-blocking ability than their run-blocking ability.
Table 10
Effect of Salary of Running Backs’ YBC
Variables
YBC

(1)
0.474**
(2.57)

(2)
0.170**
(2.42)

(3)
0.155***
(2.73)

Run control

0.112*
(1.70)

0.166**
(2.39)

0.095*
(1.67)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.161**
(-2.35)

-0.144**
(-2.00)

-0.099*
(-1.69)

85

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Position guard

1.006
(1.43)

-0.027
(-0.27)

-0.010
(-0.12)

Position tackle

1.338*
(1.90)

0.084
(0.80)

0.080
(0.93)

YBC*guard

-1.100
(-1.51)

YBC*tackle

-1.355*
(-1.86)

Same scheme

0.065
(1.01)

0.056
(0.83)

0.025
(0.44)

Age

-0.181
(-2.74)

-0.238***
(-3.36)

-0.227***
(-3.95)

Overall pick

-0.281***
(-4.28)

-0.257***
(-3.69)

-0.169***
(-2.97)

Games started
Observations
R squared

0.476***
(8.32)
208
0.206

180
0.233

230
0.347

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Running Backs’ AYPC
As a similar metric for run blocking to ALY and YBC, the AYPC of running backs
reflects an offensive lineman’s ability to run-block. The better a player blocks, the larger the
running backs’ AYPC ceteris paribus. The findings reflect these expectations that offensive
linemen play a key role in the performance of a running back and are demonstrated in Table
11. Specifically, the table shows that a standard deviation increase in AYPC (0.40) increases
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adjusted salary 22.1% of a standard deviation ($559,509) to 22.9% of a standard deviation
($579,763).
Table 11
Effect on Salary of Running Backs’ AYPC
Variables
AYPC

(1)
0.229***
(3.59)

(2)
0.222***
(3.30)

(3)
0.221***
(4.02)

Run control

0.120*
(-2.04)

0.179***
(2.67)

0.099*
(1.81)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.151**
(-2.24)

-0.144**
(-2.03)

-0.104*
(-1.81)

Position guard

-0.045
(-0.48)

-0.043
(-0.44)

-0.024
(-0.30)

Position tackle

0.025
(0.26)

0.053
(0.51)

0.057
(0.68)

Same scheme

0.075
(1.17)

0.061
(0.91)

0.021
(0.38)

Age

-0.204***
(-3.14)

-0.271***
(-3.92)

-0.247***
(-4.40)

Overall pick

-0.292***
(-4.51)

-0.268***
(-3.89)

-0.182***
(-3.24)

180
0.254

0.483***
(8.59)
230
0.371

Games started
Observations
R squared

208
0.215

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
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Effect on Salary of Power Percentage
Looking at successful rushing attempts in short-distance situations on third down and
fourth down, it is expected by the author that power percentage (which measures this) of the
offensive lineman’s team would have a negative impact on salary of that individual. After all,
in these crucial downs, offensive linemen play a key role in the success of the play. However,
contrary to the researcher’s expectations, Table 12 shows that power percentage has no
significant effect on salaries at the 0.10 significance level. For general managers, this finding
supports the idea that other players on offense are being held accountable for their play in
short-distance situations and that what offensive lineman do prior to reaching these
circumstances is of more importance.
Table 12
Effect on Salary of Power Percentage
Variables
Power percentage

(1)
0.055
(0.84)

(2)
0.062
(0.90)

(3)
0.062
(1.11)

Run control

0.140**
(2.12)

0.205***
(2.98)

0.127**
(2.27)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.146**
(-2.10)

-0.147**
(-2.02)

-0.105*
(-1.77)

Position guard

-0.020
(-0.21)

-0.025
(-0.25)

0.003
(0.04)

Position tackle

0.058
(0.58)

0.085
(0.80)

0.092
(1.06)

Same scheme

0.083
(1.26)

0.069
(1.01)

0.029
(0.51)

Age

-0.199***
(-2.97)

-0.269***
(-3.76)

-0.245***
(-4.20)
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Variables
Overall pick

(1)

(2)

-0.283***
(-4.23)

-0.253***
(-3.56)

-0.169***
(-2.89)

180
0.210

0.476***
(8.20)
230
0.328

Games started
Observations
R squared

208
0.167

(3)

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Stuff Percentage
Stuff percentage of the offensive lineman’s team, which measures an offense’s
inability to move the football forward on a running play, is expected by the researcher to
have a negative impact on the salary of an offensive lineman because it represents plays that
do not achieve their desired result. Furthermore, a running play, in which a running back fails
to move the ball across the line of scrimmage, could be due to a blown block by a particular
offensive lineman. As expected, stuff percentage has a negative significant effect on the
salary of an offensive lineman at the 0.05 significance level. Table 13 shows that a standard
deviation increase in the stuff percentage (2.93%) will decrease an offensive lineman’s
adjusted salary 15.4% of a standard deviation ($389,884) to 17.4% of a standard deviation
($440,518), depending on the model.
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Table 13
Effect on Salary of Stuff Percentage
Variables
Stuff percentage

(1)
-0.167**
(-2.59)

(2)
-0.174**
(-2.56)

(3)
-0.154***
(-2.78)

Non-White or Hispanic

0.134**
(2.06)

0.197***
(2.92)

0.122**
(2.22)

Other knockdowns
allowed proportion

-0.146**
(-2.13)

-0.136*
(-1.91)

-0.099*
(-1.69)

Position guard

-0.030
(-0.32)

-0.037
(-0.37)

-0.009
(-0.11)

Position tackle

0.054
(0.55)

0.086
(0.83)

0.089
(1.03)

Same scheme

0.072
(1.11)

0.063
(0.93)

0.019
(0.34)

Age

-0.176***
(-2.66)

-0.243***
(-3.46)

-0.228***
(-3.98)

Overall pick

-0.275***
(-4.19)

-0.243***
(-3.51)

-0.159***
(-2.79)

Games started
Observations
R squared

0.482***
(8.42)
208
0.191

180
0.236

230
0.348

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Play Selection of a Team and Wage Determination
This section explores the relationship between play selection of a team and wage
determination. Play selection is found to have no significant effect on the wages of different
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positions on the offensive line. Decision makers on the field, such as coaches and
quarterbacks, do not impact offensive players’ salary. Neither do team tendencies, as
illustrated in the next section. The offensive lineman’s salary is determined by their play on
the field.
Effect on Salary of Location Run Proportion
It is thought that the more a team runs to the left or right or over the gap of a
particular offensive linemen position as measured by the variable of interest, more value
would be placed on the performance of that offensive lineman. He would be a key blocker on
such plays. However, Table 14 illustrates that regular-season location run proportion of the
offensive lineman’s team has no impact on the salary of the individual at the significance
level of 0.10.
This result might in large part be due to the metric not accounting for schematics such
as pulling offensive linemen for particular plays. For instance, a play that ends up being run
several gaps away from the particular offensive lineman would not be measured in the metric
as illustrated in the picture below. However, the pulling offensive lineman might be a key
block related to the success of a run play. Thus, the run proportion metric fails to account for
certain key blocks of an offensive lineman such as the following diagrammed play.
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Table 14
Effect on Salary of Location Run Proportion
Variables
Location run
proportion

(1)
0.007
(0.09)

(2)
-0.026
(-0.33)

(3)
-0.013
(-0.20)

AYPC

0.310***
(4.26)

0.304***
(3.93)

0.281***
(4.53)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.177**
(-2.36)

-0.195**
(-2.47)

-0.118*
(-1.85)

Age

-0.179**
(-2.41)

-0.242***
(-3.08)

-0.220***
(-3.44)

Overall pick

-0.285***
(-3.90)

-0.294***
(-3.79)

-0.190***
(-3.00)

Games started
Observations
R squared

0.468***
(7.26)
158
0.208

137
0.237
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179
0.353

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
Effect on Salary of Run-to-Pass Ratio
Based on research demonstrating that a running back was paid more for
specialization, a team that values running the ball or passing the ball more might place a
higher value on offensive linemen who possess a unique skill set as a run blocker or pass
blocker. Thus, the coefficients of the run-to-pass ratio would be of interest to the researcher.
While the coefficients were positive in all three models of Table 15, the ratio of regularseason run attempts to pass attempts on the offensive lineman’s team has no impact on the
salary of the offensive lineman at the significance level of 0.10. Thus, general managers
appear to focus solely on what the player does on the field versus the team tendency to run or
pass the football.
Table 15
Effect on Salary of Run-to-Pass Ratio
Variables
Run-to-pass ratio

(1)
0.060
(0.92)

(2)
0.076
(1.11)

(3)
0.079
(1.44)

Run control

0.142**
(2.16)

0.192***
(2.77)

0.118**
(2.10)

Pass control

-0.126*
(-1.92)

-0.124*
(-1.80)

-0.095*
(-1.70)

Non-White or Hispanic

-0.135**
(-2.05)

-0.135*
(-1.94)

-0.083
(-1.47)

Age

-0.206***
(-3.15)

-0.277***
(-4.01)

-0.255***
(-4.53)
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Variables
Overall pick

(1)
-0.299***
(-4.54)

(2)
-0.277***
(-4.02)

Games started
Observations
R squared

(3)
-0.177***
(-3.09)
0.467***
(8.15)

207
0.170

179
0.212

230
0.335

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Model 1 is a subsample in which games started is greater than 3. Model 2 is a subsample in
which games started is greater than 5.
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Conclusion
How does one measure the value of an offensive lineman? This paper is one of the
first to examine factors that impact the wages of National Football League (NFL) offensive
linemen. The research questions: How are the wages for different positions in the NFL
offensive line affected by individual player performance? How are the wages of different
positions in the NFL offensive line affected by team performance? How does relative
performance of NFL offensive linemen affect their wages? How does the individual
performance of nonoffensive line positions affect the pay of different positions in the NFL
offensive line? How does the play selection of a team affect pay of different positions in the
NFL offensive line? The author addressed these questions by utilizing multivariate linear
regression with adjusted salary as the response variable for the years 2011-2016. To measure
these variables, data from resources such as STATS LLC and Spotrac was utilized.
Summary of Major Findings
Starting at the position level, an offensive tackle’s run-blocking ability is less
important than a center’s ability to run-block. And regardless of an offensive lineman’s
position, the number of games started consistently has a significant impact on salaries in
models, highlighting the importance of an offensive lineman being available to play. With
the offensive line working as a unit on every offensive snap of the ball, the pass-blocking
ability of an individual offensive lineman is separately evaluated from that of his teammates
by personnel evaluators such as general managers. However, the difference between the
player’s proportion of knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his new team’s proportion
of knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks was negatively significant, a statistic that highlights
the economical concept of diminishing returns. Lastly, the nonsignificant power percentage
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findings in models support the idea that other players on offense are being held accountable
for their play in short-distance situations.
Summary of Findings
The author found that various factors at the individual and team levels consistently
impact the salary of an NFL offensive lineman. These factors include individual player
performance, team performance, and individual performance of nonoffensive linemen.
Relative performance variables demonstrated mixed results, while play selection had no
impact on salary.
For individual player performance, which captures individual productivity, regular
season penalty proportion, games started, and proportion of knockdowns allowed were found
to be significant. As expected, penalty proportion and knockdowns allowed had a negative
association on salary, while games started was positively related. The findings demonstrate
that individual labor components in a complex team sport such as football impact how a
player is compensated. These results agree with findings in the literature done by others, such
as Jones and Walsh (1988) and Idson and Kahane (2000). Those studies used various
individual metrics in hockey and found that career average points scored per game and
average penalty minutes per game were positive and significant in most of their wage
models.
In terms of the effects of individual performance of nonoffensive line positions on the
wages of offensive linemen, the present analysis indicated that all metrics of interest, with the
exception of the power percentage, were positive and significant. Thus, the determination of
an offensive lineman’s salary also depends on the assistance that he receives from
teammates, such as a running back. These findings advance work done on quarterbacks’
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wages by Berri and Simmons (2009), who utilized offense salary to proxy for quality of a
quarterback’s teammates. Offense salary was found to be positive and significant in most of
the models.
To address team performance, passing yards, rushing yards, and points scored were
analyzed. All were found to be positive and significant in the respective models. These teamlevel metrics demonstrate how joint production determines the wages of an individual
offensive lineman by NFL general managers. These results support the findings of Simmons
and Berri (2009), which determined that rushing yards and receiving yards of running backs
positively impacted their salaries. For their other study (Berri & Simmons, 2009) on wage
discrimination of quarterbacks, passing yards was found to be positive and significant.
For player performance relative to their teammates, effect on salary of the difference
between a player’s proportion of knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his offensive line
teammates was not significant. This nonsignificance suggests that complementary effects in
football might not be as important as in the sport of hockey, according to the study of Idson
and Kahane (2000). They found a significant negative interaction between individual average
penalty minutes per game and team average penalty minutes per game. That finding
demonstrated diminishing returns in terms of roster composition of enforcers. However,
diminishing returns is supported as the effect on salary of the difference between the player’s
proportion of knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks and his new team’s proportion of
knockdowns allowed on quarterbacks in my results was significant. Lastly, both metrics in
the NFL that reflected play selection (run proportion and run-to-pass ratio) were found to be
insignificant.
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Managerial Applications
General managers and decision makers in the NFL can find value in the models as an
additional multitool kit to help them evaluate players. Additionally, significant and
nonsignificant coefficients of the explanatory variables can be used to look at possible
market inefficiencies, in which a general manager could gain a competitive advantage. In the
research, the nonsignificance of the power percentage variable could highlight the
undervaluing of an offensive lineman’s ability to succeed on third down and fourth down and
on short-yardage plays. A general manager can use this material to compensate a player
below the value of his actual production. In baseball, this idea is known as the moneyball
hypothesis. The term originated after a reporter wrote about baseball executive Billy Beane’s
tactics for building championship team in the American League West division during the
2002 season, in spite of the lack of means to pay for star power.
Another implication is for labor economists who use American football to study
concepts such as joint production, individual production, and racial discrimination. The
research provides empirical evidence for all three of those concepts mentioned. Football,
being a team sport, reflects the challenges of many business organizations in terms of its
numerous interactions between teammates. Thus, these concepts can be applied to better
understand the functioning and dynamics of the markets that influence wage labor.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research advanced the methods of determining wages for NFL offensive
linemen. Future development of better tracking methods is needed to fully enumerate
individual offensive lineman performance. At the individual level, a run-blocking metric
would be beneficial. A publicly available plus/minus run-blocking metric, in which an
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individual offensive lineman would be graded a plus for a successful run block and a minus
for an unsuccessful run block, would give the researcher an indicator of individual
performance to evaluate an offensive lineman’s run-blocking ability. To gather this data,
game film would be evaluated by a person with strong familiarity of all of the running plays
of the specific team, in particular, the individual goals of each offensive lineman during each
run play. Additionally, controls that could better evaluate the talent level of the opponent as a
run defender and pass defender would be beneficial. One way to do this would be to tally the
number of individual matchups between an offensive lineman and particular pass rushers he
faces during every game of the season. Doing this for all passing plays of the lineman with a
tool to evaluate each pass rusher’s ability (another metric) would enable us to gain a better
understanding of the level of difficulty of individual opponents. Similarly, this could be done
for all running plays in which the offensive lineman participates.
Building on enumerating individual offensive lineman performance to reach the goal
of marginal production, one needs to be able to allocate individual contributions to joint
production. Using a combination block on a running play as an example of joint production,
an expert on offensive line play (such as an NFL offensive line coach) would need to break
down the level of difficulty of both offensive lineman’s responsibilities. Finally, one needs to
be able to weight the significance of each individual’s action as it relates to the outcome of
the game. An expert would need to track and identify an objective value of each block in
which an individual lineman participates. For example, a combination block between a left
tackle and left guard might yield an outcome of 8 yards rushing by a running back. The left
tackle, based on the difficulty of the combination block, its relative importance, and his
success could be credited with 2 yards of the outcome. Using the marginal production
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function and a revenue function that addresses potential reverse causalities, one can estimate
what a player is worth to a particular team in the open market. This method can be extended
to all positions in the NFL such that you can compare which positions on an NFL team are
most important in terms of winning.
Final Remarks
The analysis has shined an additional light on wage determination in sport and was
one of the first studies to focus on the market of NFL offensive linemen. Wage determination
models shed light on productivity and what is valued by organizations as a whole. Thirty-two
NFL organizations vie against each other every season to assemble the most competitive
roster in hopes of ultimately winning a Super Bowl. One of the pieces to building a roster is
the offensive line, and part of the construction occurs during the free agency market. This
study has revealed some of the factors that go into determining what an offensive lineman is
paid in free agency. Many factors impact the wages of a player, such as age, the number of
games started, and the proportion of individual knockdowns allowed.
Understanding the impact of these factors, NFL general managers have a multitool kit
at their disposal for the evaluation of this position as they consider using free agency in roster
construction. Further research would benefit general managers’ goals of gaining more insight
to estimate how much they should pay their employees and of possible market inefficiencies
in the offensive line. These market inefficiencies can enable an organization to gain a
competitive advantage. Extending this research beyond offensive linemen to every other
position on a team would be highly beneficial for an NFL organization.
Additionally, economists have a launching point for future research on the labor
components of a complex team sport. Because the population consists only of players in free
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agency, an economist could better evaluate the impact that performance has on wages.
Further research might ultimately unlock the marginal revenue products of players and
enable economists to look into possible racial discrimination.
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Appendix A
Comparison of OBR Model and Selected Models from Research Questions
Table I
Comparison of OBR Model and Selected Models from Research Question #1
Variables

OBR Model

Individual
-6.364**
knockdowns
(-2.10)
allowed
proportion
Games started 0.073***
(7.44)
Individual
0.620
proportion of (0.09)
plays with a
penalty
Team rushing
0.0007**
yards
(2.49)
Team passing
yards

-.0003**
(-2.11)

Points scored

0.004
(3.36)
0.196
(1.08)
-1.334**
(-2.29)
-0.159*
(-1.67)
0.030
(0.23)
0.266*
(1.75)
0.079
(0.90)
-0.082***
(-4.36)
-0.258***
(-3.88)

Adjusted line
yards
Run-to-pass
ratio
Non-White or
Hispanic
Position guard
Position tackle
Same scheme
Age
Overall pick

Research
Question
#1A
-0.206***
(-2.93)

Research
Question #1B

Research
Question #1C

0.556***
(11.68)
-0.223***
(-3.48)

-0.137**
(-2.04)
0.020
(0.21)
0.130
(1.21)
0.104
(1.65)
-0.206***
(-3.20)
-0.232***
-3.63

-0.095*
(-1.93)

0.079*
(1.71)
-0.178***
(-3.78)
-0.149***
(-3.09)
102

-0.116*
(-1.77)
0.044
(0.48)
0.111
(1.14)
0.035
(0.56)
-0.187***
(-2.93)
-0.271***
(-2.93)

Variables

OBR Model

Tackle (as
dichotomous
variable)
Other
knockdowns
allowed
proportion
Pass control

Research
Question
#1A

Research
Question #1B

Research
Question #1C

0.054
(1.09)
-0.243***
(-3.77)

Observations

228

204

301

-0.123*
(-1.95)
0.133**
(2.09)
229

R^2

0.430

0.245

0.381

0.183

Run control

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Table II
Comparison of OBR Model and Selected Models from Research Question #2
Variables

OBR Model

Individual
knockdowns
allowed proportion
Games started

-6.364**
(-2.10)

Individual
proportion of plays
with a penalty
Team rushing
yards

Research Question
#2ab

Research
Question #2c

0.073***
(7.44)
0.620
(0.09)
0.0007**
(2.49)

0.286***
(4.16)

Team passing
yards

-.0003**
(-2.11)

0.201***
(2.80)

Points scored

0.004
(3.36)

0.316***
(4.72)
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Variables

OBR Model

Research Question
#2ab

Research
Question #2c

Adjusted line yards

0.196
(1.08)
-1.334**
(-2.29)
-0.159*
(-1.67)
0.030
(0.23)
0.266*
(1.75)
0.079
(0.90)
-0.082***
(-4.36)
-0.258***
(-3.88)

-0.124*
(-1.74)
-0.016
(-0.16)
0.065
(0.63)
0.075
(1.12)
-0.257***
(-3.72)
-0.284***
(-4.05)

-0.123*
(-1.74)
0.007
(0.08)
0.102
(1.00)
0.077
(1.16)
-0.233***
(-3.41)
-0.276***
(-4.03)

Observations

228

180

180

R^2

.430

0.254

0.260

Run-to-pass ratio
Non-White or
Hispanic
Position guard
Position tackle
Same scheme
Age
Overall pick

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Table III
Comparison of OBR Model and Selected Model from Research Question #4
Variables

OBR Model

Individual knockdowns
allowed proportion
Games started

-6.364**
(-2.10)
0.073***
(7.44)
0.620
(0.09)
0.0007**
(2.49)
-.0003**
(-2.11)
0.004
(3.36)

Individual proportion of
plays with a penalty
Team rushing yards
Team passing yards
Points scored

Research Question #4a
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Variables

OBR Model

Research Question #4a

Adjusted line yards

0.196
(1.08)
-1.334**
(-2.29)
-0.159*
(-1.67)
0.030
(0.23)
0.266*
(1.75)
0.079
(0.90)
-0.082***
(-4.36)
-0.258***
(-3.88)

0.234***
(3.64)

Run-to-pass ratio
Non-White or Hispanic

Observations

228

-0.165**
(-2.45)
-0.021
(-0.22)
0.040
(0.41)
0.073
(1.14)
-0.190***
(-2.94)
-0.279***
(-4.32)
0.110*
(1.71)
208

R^2

.430

0.216

Position guard
Position tackle
Same scheme
Age
Overall pick
Run control

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Table IV
Comparison of OBR Model and Selected Model from Research Question #5
Variables

OBR Model

Individual knockdowns
allowed proportion
Games started

-6.364**
(-2.10)
0.073***
(7.44)
0.620
(0.09)
0.0007**
(2.49)
-.0003**
(-2.11)

Individual proportion of
plays with a penalty
Team rushing yards
Team passing yards

Research Question #5b

0.467***
(8.15)
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Variables

OBR Model

Points scored

0.004
(3.36)
0.196
(1.08)
-1.334**
(-2.29)
-0.159*
(-1.67)
0.030
(0.23)
0.266*
(1.75)
0.079
(0.90)
(-0.082)***
(-4.36)
-0.258***
(-3.88)

Adjusted line yards
Run-to-pass ratio
Non-White or Hispanic
Position guard
Position tackle
Same scheme
Age

Research Question #5b

0.079
(1.44)
-0.083
(-1.47)

Observations

228

-0.255***
(-4.53)
-0.177***
(-3.09)
0.118**
(2.10)
-0.095*
(-1.70)
230

R^2

.430

0.335

Overall pick
Run Control
Pass control

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
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